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ABSTRACT

The present study focuses on the conception of immanence and
the manner in which it evolved from the seventeenth century, as
represented in Henry Vaughan's Silex Scintillans, to the nineteenth
century, as represented in Samuel Taylor Coleridge's nature poetry
and his collection of letters, Confessions of an Inquiring

Spirit.

Vaughan's conception of a basic immanence of reflected divinity in
nature

evolved,

over

the

course

of two

hundred

Coleridge's version of an immanence based on reason.

years,

into

These two

different conceptions of immanence in part formed the basis of the
respective faiths of Vaughan and Coleridge.

Vaughan's traditional

Augustinian faith accepted unquestioningly the Great Chain of Being,
whereas

Coleridge's

rationalist

faith

answered

the

theological

challenges from the Age of Reason by exploring intellectually
Christianity and accepting what tenets are reconcilable with reason.
The Age of Reason and scientific inquiry effectively destroyed
the traditional faith in order, dominant prior to about 1700, by
placing a trust in humankind's rational faculty and by effectively
dissolving

once-rigid

boundaries

between

nature

and

humanity.

Societal factors and Christianity's response to empirical inquiry also
played crucial roles in this dissolution of Elizabethan cosmology.
Vaughan, who believed so devoutly in order, unwittingly helped to
destroy it by contributing to the relative elevation of nature by his
intuitive insight into a simple immanence.

He thus, quite uncon-
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sciously, linked nature and the divine, a belief which was later consciously espoused by Coleridge and the other Romantics.
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

The relationship between the divine, humanity and nature has
probably always been a subject of great concern for humankind.

The

Christian relationship to God has been considered a relationship with
a supenor being, whereas the Western relationship with the natural
world has traditionally been considered one in which humanity was
superior.

Certainly, the concept of the Great Chain of Being,

staunchly believed in until about 1700, is validation of the ascending
hierarchy between nature, humans and God.
and the divine may be linked, m

The idea that nature

even the remotest sense, was a

new one in the Christian world.
The need for a new conception of faith arose in the period from
1600 to 1800, emerging substantially from the dissolution of the
Great Chain of Being, the Elizabethan conception of cosmological
order.

The seventeenth-century poet Henry Vaughan contributed to

this dissolution by unwittingly privileging nature through his intuitive insight into a simple immanence of reflected divinity in nature
that would find full manifestation in Coleridge two hundred years
later.

Vaughan's unquestioning faith in order constituted the tradi-

tional Augustinian faith, one of two strains of belief that Ross Garner
in Experience and the Tradition observes rn Vaughan's poetry, the
other strain being Neoplatonic.

This Augustinian faith was consid-

ered antagonistic to reason, and dominant prior to about 1700.

This

rigidly hierarchical faith could not, however, endure the dissolution
of the concept of order and the emerging trust in humankind's ability
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to reason, both inherent in the Age of Reason.

Consequently,

Vaughan's Augustinian faith became increasingly suspect in light of
the skepticism arising from both empirical and rational inquiry.
In short, the Age of Reason required a new conception of faith
adequate to

the theological challenge it had inevitably raised.

Samuel Taylor Coleridge helped satisfy this need for a new faith by
conceiving a rationalist faith.

He employed his reason to examine his

religious beliefs and chose what tenets to accept, while valuing the
mysteries that reason cannot explain.

He believed devoutly m the

tenets he chose to accept, thus creating a new orthodoxy of immanence based on reason, one that he believed could help destroy the
vacuum necessarily created by the Age of Reason.
My thesis examines the ways m which Henry Vaughan and

Samuel Taylor Coleridge treat nature m its relationship to God and
humankind, in the context of the time periods in which they lived.
Vaughan, who lived in the seventeenth century and was subject to
its cosmology of intuitively comprehensible order, accepted the idea
of human dominion over nature, espoused by Christianity and the
Bible.

Unlike most of his contemporaries, however, he inscribed na-

ture with importance and believed it capable of modeling virtues for
humanity.

In contrast, Coleridge was subject to the cosmology of the

Age of Reason and its gradually narrowing gap between humans and
nature.

Coleridge adopted this cosmology but took it further: he saw

a reciprocal and nearly equal relationship between humans and nature.

I demonstrate that Vaughan initiated intuitively, through his

subtle disruption of conventional hierarchy, a transformative dynamic in the relationship between

God, humans and nature, that
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would become a conscious, fundamental belief of Coleridge and the

other Romantics.
Most of Vaughan's contemporaries held the popular Elizabethan
opinion that nature was significant only in its degree of subjugation
to human will.
that both

Even George Herbert, author of The Temple, the work

inspired

and influenced profoundly

Vaughan's

Scintillans, did not attempt to question this traditional view.

Silex
Unlike

Herbert in The Temple, however, which was based on the architecture and liturgy of the Anglican church, Vaughan in Silex Scintillans
moves outdoors for inspiration and, significantly, sees nature as
having the inherent capacity to offer instruction through reflection
for humans.
Vaughan's poems "And do they so?" "Cock-crowing," "The Ass,"
"The Constellation," "Man," "The Palm-tree," "The Bird" and "The
Check" all view nature as a didactic presence for humans.

By observ-

ing nature, humans can learn humility, obedience and the importance
of living in fear of the Second Coming.

Thus these lessons are capa-

ble of reminding humans of their duties toward God and also of humanity's privileged status on earth.

Vaughan was a devout Anglican;

his poetry bespeaks a deep love of God and an appreciation of traditional, conservative views, including the Augustinian faith, reflective
of the era in which he lived.

Yet, while he adopted fully the

Elizabethan cosmology and its emphasis on order, his suggestive mscription of values within nature made him significant in his era.

I

show how Vaughan's intuition was, .unbeknownst to him, actually a
factor in the dissolution of the Great Chain of Being in which he believed so avidly.
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Some critics have viewed Vaughan's poetry as pre-Romantic,
based on his occasional themes of the loss of simplicity and longing to
be an innocent child.
over-simplification.

I show that such an assertion is, at best, hasty
But more importantly, at-times lively critical

debate over Vaughan's alleged pre-Romanticism has ignored largely
the more subtle implications of the debate itself--namely, the significance of the fact that nature is inscribed with an importance not otherwise observed in his age.

I demonstrate that the existence of the

debate itself verifies Vaughan's intuition and its full fruition in
Coleridge.
Coleridge's definition of immanence was an evolution from
Vaughan's simple immanence, based in part on his perception of intuitive values in nature.

Immanence, in Coleridge's view, was based

on truths derived from the human mind, which helped to form his
rationalist faith.

I argue that Coleridge was able to regard imma-

nence and faith as critically related to intellectual faculties because
of the time period in which he lived and the cosmology to which he
was subject.
Coleridge lived during the late 1700s and early 1800s, a time
during

which

orthodox

Christianity

was

being

debated

openly.

Although Coleridge verges on an implicit pantheism in many of his
poems, he never truly questioned most orthodox Christian beliefs.
He adopted the investigative, skeptical stance of the Age of Reason,
but as he remarks at Highgate late in his life, "With my heart I never
did abandon the name of Christ" (Brett 223 ). I show how Coleridge
was able to rectify reason and faith by his conception of a rationalist
faith, a faith which, in the battle between reason and faith, seemed to
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favor faith, but still managed to view the rational faculty as critical
to a new conception of faith.
The Age of Reason and its scientific inquiry substantially narrowed the gap between humans and nature, as Christianity seemed
to lose validity.

I show how a dissolution began in the rigid bound-

anes between humans and animals that had been espoused for so
long by Christianity.

By 1800 the West had experienced a change:

the world seemed no longer solely anthropocentric.

Coleridge was

subject to this new cosmology, and he adopted it; however, he carried
it to a more extreme conclusion--he saw a reciprocal and nearly
egalitarian relationship between humanity and nature.

He refers to

this reciprocity as the "one Life within us and abroad," a concept he
shares with the other Romantics such as Wordsworth (Abrams 15).
The Romantic "innocent child of nature" in "The Foster-Mother's
Tale," the unfinished "Wanderings of Cain" and "Christabel" conceive
nature as a force with which to commune, even to love.
parallels the innocence of children and nature.

Coleridge

Thus in the Romantic

Age, humans were viewed as having the capacity to be much more
intimate with nature than they were ever viewed in previous ages.
Not only was nature seen by Coleridge as a power with which
to commune, but also, akin to Vaughan's implicit intuition, he saw
nature as capable of providing didactic lessons, the ultimate aim of
which was to know God.

This explicitly didactic attribute is apparent

in "The Nightingale," "This Lime-tree Bower My Prison" and "Frost at
Midnight."

But unlike Vaughan's poetry, these poems are much more

subtle in their references to God and consider nature a "ministry."

In

other words, God is so readily knowable in nature that, to worship
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Him, one need just walk outdoors and be receptive with an objective
and attentive openness, a practical realization of immanence.

For

Coleridge, churches were not necessary to worship and to reveal both
God's essence and presence, an opinion Vaughan would clearly scorn.
The Age of Reason and the decline of Christianity, however, allowed
even devout theologians like Coleridge to be a bit more experimental
with their theories and skeptical in their beliefs.

This inquiring atti-

tude was consequently manifested in Coleridge's rationalist faith,
which allowed faith to survive, albeit in a broader conception.

Thus,

as I argue, Coleridge was able to salvage effectively the essence of
Christianity, despite the theological challenge from the new scientific
empirical methods and the enshrinement of rational know ledge.

7
VAUGHAN'S INTUITIVE VIRTUES AND IMMANENCE

The relationship between God, humans and nature in the time
of Vaughan was clear-cut for the majority of people.

God reigned

supreme over both humans and nature, and humans likewise were
superior to nature, in a static vision of the universe called the Great
Chain of Being.

Vaughan, however, was different than most of his

contemporaries; he felt nature's virtues could serve as lessons for
humans, reminding them of their often-forgotten duties toward the
Creator.

He viewed nature in a new light by unwittingly elevating it

through his suggestive inscription of importance, and, while this
implication had little effect on his own age, his belief set in motion a
transformative dynamic in the relationship between God, humans
and nature.

A radical re.,.conception of this relationship was to

emerge in the Romantic Age, subject as it was to the dramatic influence of science and its consequent implications for theology.
Vaughan's faith in the permanence of the Great Chain of Being
constitutes the Augustinian faith.

He is unquestioning in this faith,

but unknowingly, undercuts it by intuiting virtues in nature, as I will
examine closely in this chapter.

These virtues are part of a simple

immanence which will be manifested fully in Coleridge, as his cosmology is necessarily different, due to the Age of Reason.

It is safe to say that Vaughan .. regards nature as virtuous.

All

of God's creation is stable, obedient, humble, patient, constant and
attentive to the Second Coming of Christ, always following God's will.
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Humans can regard nature and see the virtues that they need to live
a better life--one in which God is of the utmost importance and concern.

Although Vaughan appreciates nature for its beauty and good

qualities, it is a severe mistake to believe that nature is the end that
Vaughan seeks.

Nature primarily serves as a means to God, as a re-

flector of the divine world.

And Vaughan is no pantheist; the Church

is still a necessity to experience God, "Vaughan never suggested it is
possible to pass directly from the study of nature to the experience
of contact with the divine" (Pettet 93).

The end of "The Water-fall"

reveals Vaughan's priorities:
0 my invisible estate,
My glorious liberty, still late!
Thou art the channel my soul seeks,
Not this with cataracts and creeks. (1.37-40)
"My invisible estate" (1.37) and "My glorious liberty" (1.38) refer to
his release from his earthly bonds and reumon with God.
pra1srng

the

sacredness

and

mystical

nature

Vaughan brings into perspective his praise.

of

the

After

waterfall,

The waterfall, although

important in itself, is not nearly as important as getting back to God.
Vaughan believes nature reflects and reveals God (immanence),
that it declares God's glory.

Nature is divine, and as Garner believes,

by comprehending nature, humans can understand the di vine world
(36). Nature reveals the divine only in glimpses but is still worthy of
contemplation, because it does manifest God (Pettet 97).
tude is pervasive in Silex Scintillans:

This atti-
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Observe God in his works; here fountains flow,
Birds sing, beasts feed, fish leap, and the earth stands fast;
Above are restless motions, running lights,
Vast circling azure, giddy clouds, days, nights.
When seasons change, then lay before thine eyes
His wondrous method; mark the various scenes
In heaven; hail, thunder, rain-bows, snow, and ice,
Calms, tempests, light, and darkness by his means;
Thou canst not miss his praise; each tree, herb, flower
Are shadows of his wisdom, and his power.
("Rules and Lessons" 1.87-96)
Because nature is reflective of God and because it contains
virtues that humans either do not have or usually do not employ,
nature can be a didactic presence for humankind.

Indeed, Vaughan

wonders openly in "The Star" what "man may learn from thee
[nature]" (l.12), and, in "The Constellation, he claims "the herb he
[humans] treads knows much, much more" (1.28) than humans do.
One of Vaughan's favorite subjects is the contrast between nature's vigilance for Christ's return and humanity's neglect of this (as
he conceives it) inevitability.
"And do they so?":

This contrast is the central theme of
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And do they so? have they a sense
Of ought but influence?
Can they their heads lift, and expect,
And groan too? why the elect
Can do no more: my volumes said
They were all dull, and dead,
They judged them senseless, and their state
Wholly inanimate.
Go, go; seal up thy looks,
And burn thy books.
I would I were a stone, or tree,
Or flower by pedigree,
Or some poor high-way herb, or spring
To flow, or bird to sing!
Then should I (tied to one sure state,)
All day expect my date;
But I am sadly loose, and stray
A giddy blast each way;
0 let me not thus range!
Thou canst not change.
Sometimes I sit with thee, and tarry
An hour or so, then vary.
Thy other creatures in this scene
Thee only aim, and mean;
Some rise to seek thee, and with heads
Erect peep from their beds;
Others, whose birth is in the tomb,
And cannot quit the womb,
Sigh there, and groan for thee,
Their Ii berty.
0 let me not do less! shall they
Watch, while I sleep, or play?
Shall I thy mercies still abuse
With fancies, friends, or news?
0 brook it not! thy blood is mine,
And my soul should be thine;
0 brook it not! why wilt thou stop
After whole showers one drop?
Sure, thou wilt joy to see
Thy sheep with thee.

11

Vaughan interprets the constant watch of animals for predators
as a watch for the Savior.

He wishes he were an animal or plant, and

not a man, for then he would be "tied to one sure state" (l.15).
Instead, he only prays for an hour or so, then occupies himself with
.

"fancies, friends or news" (l.34).

-

He asks that he not do less than the

animals, that he be more like them, on constant alert for the Second
Coming.
This poem brings into focus how the creatures glorify God.
They do so not by intention, which implies will and reason, but unconsciously (Garner 98), by their very existence.

Humans, on the

other hand, have will and reason, which is of course the disadvantage
that allows them to be so concerned with the temporal.
vantage over humans lies m its simplicity.

Nature's ad-

Garner summanzes ef-

fectively Vaughan's views of humankind and nature, "Man is worse
than the other creatures because he is morally reprehensible, which
they cannot be, and better than they because he shares the divine
Intellectus, which they do not, and is the image of God, which they

are not" (22).
"Cock-crowing" also concerns nature's intentness on God.

At

night, the rooster watches for the morning, which Vaughan associates
with the Second Coming:
Their eyes watch for the morning hue,
Their little grain expelling night
So shine and sings, as if it knew
The path unto the house of light. (1. 7-10)
Vaughan thus idealizes the rooster as· a creature which concentrates
only upon God.
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Another virtue nature has is its obedience to the divine will.
In "The Ass," Vaughan represents the ass as an animal obedient and
mindful only of God.

He asks God to "Teach both mine eyes and feet

to move I Within the bounds set by thy love" (l.15-16), not to do
anything that God does not want him to do.
In "The Constellation," Vaughan views the stars as paragons of
obedience and order, as opposed to human restlessness and depravity due to the Fall.

The constellation always moves with "exact obe-

dience" (1.5), with no signs of sloth or weariness.

Humans, on the

other hand, are idolatrous ("Adores dead dust [l.19]) and consider
"music and mirth" (l.21) to be necessities, instead of the real necessity, concentration on God and his will.

Humans seek the stars'

"Obedience, Order, Light" (l.29), because "Our guides prove wandering
stars" (l.46).

Our troubles are due to the Fall, or swerving from "our

first love" (l.48).

Vaughan asks God to "Settle, and fix our hearts"

(l.55), in order to have the constancy of the stars.

Vaughan makes

clear his belief that all of nature can show humans obedience, not
only the stars, in his crucial line "And taught obedience by thy whole
Creation" (l.55).

Nature, by its very existence, teaches obedience.

Humility is also modeled by nature and, as virtues go, is closely
linked with obedience.

In "The Constellation," once humans are

"taught obedience by thy whole Creation" (l.55), they can form a
"humble, holy nation" (l.56).

"Grant I may soft and lowly be" (l.17)

Vaughan asks God in "The Ass."
Obedience to God's will and humility toward God are traditional
Christian virtues; Vaughan, not surprisingly, is not treading new
ground here.

The human submission to divinity, moreover, confirms
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the broader concept of order; humans are less than God and must act

on a daily basis accordingly.

Any departure from God's path equals

utmost presumption.
The stability of God's creatures juxtaposed against the comparative instability of humankind is the central concern of "Man":
Weighing the steadfastness and state
Of some mean things which here below reside,
Where birds like watchful clocks the noiseless date
And intercourse of times divide,
Where bees at night get home and hive, and flowers
Early, as well as late,
Rise with the sun, and set in the same bowers;
I would (said I) my God would give
The staidness of these things to man! for these
To his divine appointments ever cleave,
And no new business breaks their peace;
The birds nor sow, nor reap, yet sup and dine,
The flowers without clothes live,
Yet Solomon was never dressed so fine.
Man hath still either toys, or care,
He hath no root, nor to one place is tied,
But ever restless and irregular
About this earth doth run and ride,
He knows he hath a home, but scarce knows where,
He says it is so far
That he hath quite forgot how to go there.
He knocks at all doors, strays and roams,
Nay hath not so much wit as some stones have
Which in the darkest nights point to their homes,
By some his sense their Maker gave;
Man is the shuttle, to whose winding quest
And passage through these looms
God ordered motion, but ordained no rest.
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As Pettet observes, in this poem nature is represented as
teaching directly by the good it manifests (96).

Birds, bees and flow-

ers set examples for humans as consistently completing the tasks
they need to survive at the same time every day.

Vaughan believes

these tasks are "divine appointments" (1.10), suggesting to the reader
his belief that nature worships God by its very existence: "All things
that be, praise him" ("The Bird" [l.11]).

Vaughan devoutly wishes God

would allow humans to be as steadfast in their worship as nature is
in its existence.

Instead, humans have lost sight of what is really

important--God ("He knows he hath a home, but . . . he hath quite
forgot how to go there" [1.19, 21]), and instead they are "restless and
irregular" (l.17).

Nature has inherent knowledge (knowledge as part

of the divine consciousness, not knowledge as humans have acquired
it through mental faculties) that humans do not have: "He [a human
being] hath not so much wit as some stones have" (l.23).

God's crea-

tures "point to their homes [Heaven]" (1.24) by the "hid sense their
maker gave" (1.25), whereas man is a "shuttle" (1.26), full of "motion"
(1.28).

Line 23, "Nay hath not so much wit as some stones have," no

doubt sounds merely humorous to modern-day taste, but Vaughan
was serious.

All of creation, from the animate to the inanimate,

shares in the knowledge of the divine consc10usness.

In fact,

Vaughan is known for his rather odd insistence on sentience m
stones, apparent in "The Stone," "Palm-Sunday" and "The Day of
Judgement" (Hutchinson 176).
Patience, as well, is

exemplifie~. by

nature.

In "The Palm-tree,"

the tree is interpreted to be "pressed and bowed" (1.3) by the original
sin by which both humankind and nature were thrust from God's fa-

vor ("now shut from the breath I And air of Eden" [1.5-6]).
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But the

palm-tree is patient for the redemption of the Second Coming:
Here is the patience of the Saints; this tree
Is watered by their tears, as flowers are fed
With dew by night; but One you cannot see
Sits here and numbers all the tears they shed. (1.21-4)
The tree is watered by the tears of the saints, revealing the closeness
of the divine and nature.

The palm-tree in part symbolizes the

plight of fallen humankind.

We, like the palm-tree, are "pressed and

bowed" (1.3), degraded by our sins, but, perversely, we continue to
live well despite our flaws, akin to the palm-tree: "for the more he's
bent I The more he grows" (1.8-9).

The palm-tree, however, provides

"a forthright object lesson in the patience required for enduring life
beneath the veil" (Calhoun 193).

Until our redemption in Christ,

Vaughan believes we must be patient, for He will come, and provide
"Man's life, and your [nature's] full liberty" ("Palm-Sunday" [1.17]).
"The Bird" bears thematical similarities to "The Palm-tree."

By

observing a bird, Vaughan learns that he must pass his life with a
patience that will enlighten him (Calhoun 199).

The bird endures a

stormy night, but when morning comes, it smgs, and Vaughan interprets these songs as hymns praising God.

Similarly, despite earthly

hardships (symbolized in the poem by the "dark fowls" of night [1.25],
and, generally, the land turning to "brimstone" [l.29]), Vaughan realizes that he must be patient, "Till the Day-Spring breaks forth again
from high" (l.32).
One of the more poignant lessons humans need to see in nature
1s the inevitability of death.

Vaughan believes in the traditional

Christian view that earthly life means little and that the afterlife
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"beyond the veil" is much more important than the rewards of expe-

rience.

In "The Check," Vaughan begs his fellow humans to realize

that the earthly life is short and to do God's will in order to gain salvation in heaven.
Of the four stanzas in the poem, Vaughan dedicates two to this
lesson of Creation: "All things teach us to die" (l.20).

All animals and

plants we should take note of for this reason, especially pets, as they
are m some ways closer to the human race:
View thy fore-runners: creatures given to be
Thy youth's companions,
Take their leave, and die; birds, beats, each tree
All that have growth, or breath
Have one large language, Death. (l.25-9)
Interestingly, although Vaughan is a conservative Anglican, he
does not take the medieval stance that this life is nothing, meaningless, and that temporal life should be viewed only as a steppingstone to God.

While Vaughan, in many poems, reveals a scorn for the

earthly and thus transient, as opposed to the divine and eternal, m
"The Check" a sense of urgency for the appreciation of this life is
borne out to some degree.

He refers to this life as a "glimpse of light"

(1.24) not to be played away.
to night.

He compares this life to day and death

Day and night denote divinity in Vaughan's poetry, which

bespeaks his hermetic influence, whereas he might be expected to
view death as light, because it could signify a reunion with God, and
this life as death, because it might signify an estrangement from God.
Vaughan, though at times almost
reader every once rn a while.

tir~ngly

predictable, surprises the
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Although Vaughan delights in nature and its virtues, as com-

pared to corrupted humankind (blamed for the Fall), and although
nature can be a didactic presence for humans, Vaughan never doubts
the general superiority of humankind over nature.

A firm believer

in the Great Chain of Being, still "the central principle by which most
men organized their conception of the cosmos" (Simmonds 145), to
doubt such an accepted belief, one that is so basic to the Bible, would
be an unaccepable heresy for Vaughan.
doubt who is "on top."

Let us not for one minute

Vaughan argues in "Cock-crowing" that the

rooster crows at the break of day, because it reminds the rooster of
the impending Second Coming.

Vaughan wonders:

If such a tincture, such a touch,
So firm a longing can impower
Shall thy own image think it much
To watch for thy appearing hour? (l.13-18)

Even more direct is the following from the same poem:
If joys, and hopes, and earnest throes,
And hearts, whose pulse beats still for light
Are given to birds; who, but thee, knows
A love-sick soul's exalted flight? (l.31-4)
If a bird can watch so earnestly for Christ ("light" [1.32]), God surely

knows how much Vaughan desperately yearns for Him.

These lines

reveal the belief in human dominion over animals; Vaughan is essentially saying, "If a bird can love God so dearly, certainly I can do
better."
Thus Vaughan's intuition must be unwitting, as it contradicts
his espoused belief in order, his Augustinian faith.

Vaughan, how-

ever, is part of a larger movement, the new cosmology of the Age of
Reason, that will disintegrate once-sacred boundaries between hu-

manity and nature.
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In the following chapter, I will describe why

some critics have called Vaughan a pre-Romantic.
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THE DEBATE OVER VAUGHAN'S "PRE-ROMANTICISM"

Good critics, primarily before 1950, have made the error of
believing Vaughan to be pre-Romantic.
in The Poems of Henry Vaughan,

Most notably, H.C. Beeching

Silurist (1896)

and

Edmund

Blunden in On the Poetry of Henry Vaughan (1927) both argue for
consideration of Vaughan as pre-Romantic (Friedenrich 48).

As I ar-

gue in this chapter, he cannot legitimately be considered such.

More

critical, however, is the significance of the debate, for if some critics
·find Vaughan treating nature in a manner akin to the Romantics, this
comparison reveals that he is treating nature differently; he is
viewing it as more important than his contemporaries are regarding
it.

This facet of Vaughan's work has been apparently lost in all the

virulence of this debate.
I find in Silex

The few elements of pre-Romanticism that

Scintillans, do, however, portend a later fruition in

Coleridge.

Arguments can be made for Vaughan's pre-Romantic elements,
but it is a vast over-simplification to say that he is a precursor of
Romanticism.

His poetry contains elements of Romanticism; however,

to say he is pre-Romantic is jumping from points A, B and C to Z--a
drastic and erroneous conclusion.
Like the Romantics over a century later, Vaughan views childhood as a time of innocence before

th~

corruption of adulthood:
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Since all that age doth teach, is ill,
Why should I not love child-hood still?
("Childhood" 1.19-20)
For ere thou [a dead infant] knew'st how to be foul,
Death weaned thee from the world, and sin.
("The Burial of an Infant" 1.7-8)
Vaughan also apparently believes in the pre-existence of the
soul, which has lead critics to associate him closely with Wordsworth.
This concept, however, was not unique in the mindset of the seventeenth century (Garner 38).

Created by Plato, it was condemned by

the Council of Constantinople in 540 but managed, according to
Garner, to survive until the Renaissance, at which time the concept
became very popular (38).

No doubt, Vaughan read the Cambridge

Platonists, and thus had access to it, even though, Garner argues, it
was not an orthodox belief (38).

Thus it is not surprising that he

embraces this belief, from the standpoint that it was popular in his
day, although his belief in the pre-existence of the soul is a deviation
from his usual religious conservatism.
Even though only one poem from Silex Scintillans

reveals this

belief, it is on this basis that Vaughan is viewed by some as preRomantic.

"The Retreat" is Vaughan's best known poem:
Happy those early days! when I
Shined in my Angel-infancy.
Before I understood this place
Appointed for my second race,
Or taught my soul to fancy aught
But a white, celestial thought,
When I had not walked above
A mile, or two, from my first love,
And looking back (at that short space,)
Could see a glimpse of his bright-face;
When on some gilded cloud, or flower
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My gazing soul would dwell an hour,
And in those weaker glories spy
Some shadows of eternity;
Before I taught my tongue to wound
My conscience with a sinful sound,
Or had black art to dispense
A several sin to every sense,
But felt through all this fleshly dress
Bright shoots of everlastingness.
0 how I long to travel back
And tread again that ancient track!
That I might once more reach that plain,
Where first I left my glorious train,
From whence the enlightened spirit sees
That shady city of palm trees;
But (ah!) my soul with too much stay
Is drunk, and staggers in the way.
Some men a forward motion love,
But I by backward steps would move,
And when this dust falls to the urn
In that state I came return. (172-73)
Clearly

"The

Retreat"

bears

striking

Wordsworth's "Ode: Intimations of Immortality."

resemblances

to

The idea of the

pre-existence of the soul, the longing for a return to an innocent and
divine childhood and the revealed divinity of nature are present in
both poems.
poets.

Crucial differences, however, remain between the two

Wordsworth believes his memory of the "vision splendid" is

his salvation, whereas Vaughan sees death and a consequent return
to the Creator as the only possible salvation.
Vaughan's vision of nature also differs from Wordsworth's.
Often based on Biblical allusion ("That shady city of palm trees" [1.26]
from Deuteronomy 34:3-4 ), it seems rather static and unoriginal
compared to Wordsworth.

Gazing for an hour upon "some gilded

cloud, or flower" (l.11) is certainly static.

The picture of nature that
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emerges from Silex Scintillans is of a biblical landscape, and thus
idealized (Pettet 88).

This is appropriate to the overall static vision

of nature in an age where each plant, animal, vegetable and mineral
were sorted on a ladder of increasing divinity and importance, the
Great Chain of Being.

The Elizabethans' conception of nature was de-

pendent on their idea of order, and there could be no change in such
an order.

What function would such change serve?

Change equalled

chaos for the Elizabethans.
As Pettet acknowledges, Vaughan rarely speaks of the wilder
aspects of nature (88).

But Wordsworth's ode is full of motion: lambs

bounding, echoes in the mountain and rolling waters.

Wordsworth

evokes a real sense of life's vitality.
Vaughan's nature poetry is not of a a Romantic flavor. Although
Silex Scintillans describes Vaughan's Welsh homeland, it is not an

elaborate description, for nature itself is not his priority, and that is
made plain in Silex Scintillans.

Whereas the Romantics had an inti-

mate vision of nature, Vaughan looks to nature primarily to see a
shadow of life beyond the veil.

He clearly appreciates nature in it-

self, but it is not enough for him.
Thus Vaughan is not a precursor of Romanticism, although his
poetry contains elements of Romanticism.

He is a man of his time,

despite his vision of nature as didactic presence.

It can safely be

said, however, that in his poetry, as Miriam K. Starkman believes,
"we can see the distant prospect of Romanticism in the future"
(Simmonds 17).

Indeed, we see the .fruition of Vaughan's immanence

in the "distant prospect" of Romanticism.

The next chapter will in
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part address developments of issues other than those of the literary

question that create a need for a new cosmology and a new faith.
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THE AGE OF REASON AND THE DEATH OF
ANTHROPOCENTRISM

In this chapter, I will trace the emergence of a new cosmology
on a societal level and how this cosmology came into being.

In my

view, the new cosmology was dependent on the death of the faith in
order.

Many factors contributed to the emergence of the new cos-

mology of humanity and nature being more similar than they were
ever viewed before.

Vaughan had contributed to the dissolution of

the Great Chain of Being.

Science found no basis for the rigid bound-

ary between humanity and nature that was so crucial a part of the
old cosmology.

I briefly trace the death of anthropocentrism due to

scientific inquiry, changes in sociey and both Christianity's response
to the new rational mindset and its own internal problems.
Not only do I address societal factors in this chapter, but I also
situate Vaughan's and Coleridge's stances on the new scientific mindset of the Age of Reason.
the

Middle

Ages

I show that Vaughan looked back towards

in respect

to

science when

he

followed

his

Augustinian strain of thought, even though, ironically, he contributed
to the dissolution of the faith in order, just as the science to which he
was so averse would do.

I place Coleridge with one foot in the eigh-

teenth century and one foot in the nineteenth, showing that he truly
was subject to the mechanist mindset, although he would partly eschew it as he developed a Romantic cqsmology.
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The scientific mindset was born in the 1600s, during which
Vaughan lived.

Alfred North Whitehead aptly refers to this century

as the "century of genius" (43) in his all-encompassing survey of scientific advancement, Science and the Modern World.

Bacon, Harvey,

Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Pascal, Newton, Locke and Leibniz are just
a sampling of the great thinkers of the age.

Their pride was the new

method of induction (43), critical to scientific inquiry as we know it.
Although Vaughan lived in such a remarkable age in this respect, his
poetry does not reflect it.

Instead, in some of his poetry he follows

what Garner refers to as the "Augustinian strain of thought"; that is,
the belief that both humans and their ability to reason are flawed
(30).

The knowledge of human beings is not to be trusted.

We

should trust only in God, Vaughan believed, for He will endow us
with all the knowledge needed for this life.

In "The Ass," he asks

God:
Let me thy Ass be only wise
To carry, not search mysteries;
Who carries thee, is by thee led,
Who argues follows his own head. (1.21-4)
Vaughan advises those of us who desire to know the truth to rely on
faith in God, and not our scientific inquiries: "Search well another
world; who studies this, I Travels in clouds, seeks manna, where
none is" ("The Search" [l.95-6]).

Thus he poses a limitation on the

lessons we can learn from nature; we should contemplate nature and
absorb its didactic presence, but we should not go too far, Vaughan
says; we should not use our reason for such a purpose.
use our faith instead.

We should
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Vaughan is looking back towards the Middle Ages in this respect, instead of looking forward with the scientists, who espoused
the need for reason in their endeavors.

His outlook is antithetical to

the scientific mindset just being born in his age.

It is important to

remember that science in the 1600s was just the beginning of what
science means to us today--at worst, the frightening implications of a
Godless universe.

As Whitehead attests, most of Western hu-

mankind, including the scientists, were still content with a simple
faith in the order of nature (51).

The majority of the scientists,

Newton included, felt their inquiries would substantiate, not question, a Creator.
the universe.

They were true to the Elizabethan concept of order in
It was left to the 1700s, and even later, for the impli-

cations of the new science to be fully contemplated.
These implications, in part, led to a new conception of the
world.

The 1700s was the Age of Reason, the Enlightenment.

Common sense reigned.

Faith, although still a factor, seemed to have

lost considerable ground.
runnmg

The idea that the world was a machine,

itself eventually into dissolution,

popular.

emerged

and

became

Mechanism is a key word for this era, the doctrine that

natural processes as we know them could be completely explained
by the new scientific laws of chemistry and physics.
Samuel Taylor Coleridge was born in 1772 and as such was
subject to this cosmology.

He embraced it initially, praising Newton

in his "Greek Ode on Astronomy," written at Cambridge in 1793
(Wylie 32).

He spent much time contemplating Newton's work and

the "static balance" view of the umverse.

Due to his own contempla-

tions and his interaction with his intellectual peers, among other
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factors, he came in large part to reject the cosmology of the 1700s. It
is an over-simplification, however, to say that he rejected it completely, even when he became so clearly a vital part of the Romantic
revolution.

Coleridge was too much of a thinker to subscribe to any

doctrine without careful, almost excruciating, examination, as we
shall see.
Even in 1795, Coleridge had not eschewed his inheritance from
the "machine-world mindset."

By this time he was most likely quite

advanced in the development of his vitalist beliefs, apparent in much
of his nature poetry and prose from 1797-1801.

His indebtedness to

the eighteenth century was clear in his Bristol lectures of 1795 (Pym
30).

A Unitarian at this point in his life, he had a Deistic conception

of God, and engaged in what David Pym calls "rationalist logic-chopping" (30).

He was later to become more obviously orthodox in his

theology and to more obviously separate himself from the rationalism of the eighteenth century.

Still, compared to his fellow English

Romantics, he was never an extremist, even within the context of
Romanticism.

Virginia Radley believes Coleridge, taken as a whole,

stands between an eighteenth-century point of view and extreme
Romanticism (32), and I agree.

While he held the Romantic view of

nature as an organic, vital unity, his view of history and ethics is rationalist (Pym 29).

Although history and ethics are outside the scope

of this study, this point serves to show that Coleridge, m some respects, had a foot in the eighteenth century and a foot m the nineteeth.

lndecisivesness?

Hardly.

shows the breadth of his mind.
contradictory views.

!~stead,

this range of knowledge

He was never above holding partially

Whitehead has observed that contradictions are
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the very basis of new truths ( 187), and Coleridge was, m all respects,
after that elusive prey, truth.
Literary historians sometimes date

1789, the onset of the

French Revolution, as the year the "Romantic revolution" began.

Give

or take a few years, it was around this time that the benefits froin
the death of the old cosmology came to fruition.

Stale thought-pat-

terns, particularly the old anthropocentrism, had been severely and
effectively questioned on many fronts, as I will show. The demise of
the view that nature existed only for humankind's use allowed the
Romantic revolution to occur.

With this premise as a basis, the

Romantics went further, to consider nature as having a reciprocal
and almost equal relationship with humans, one vital and divine
spirit linking God, humans and nature.

It seems highly doubtful that

without the narrowing of the gap between humanity and nature
from 1600-1800, that the Romantics could have conceived of nature
as they did.

Vaughan, who, like Coleridge, believed nature as capable

of modeling lessons, the aim of which was to know God, could most
likely have never transcended the dictums and boundaries set by the
Christianity of his time.

Both Vaughan and Coleridge loved nature,

although Coleridge communicates this rapture m a manner more
agreeable to most modern tastes.

Although Vaughan was open-

minded enough to consider nature as having the capacity to model
lessons, to expect him to deal with nature as Coleridge did is too
much to ask; Christianity was strong in his age and science but in its
early development.

The relative "te<l:ring down" of Christianity, as

science gained steam, allowed the Romantics to see nature in a vastly
different manner than had previous generations.
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The Romantic discovery of nature as alive, wild, changeable
and organic is both well-documented and even better known.

What

ts less widely known is precisely what factors allowed the Romantics
to take such a revolutionary view of nature.

The Romantics viewed

nature in a different light than past generations; humans, nature and
God were imbued with one divine spirit, the "one Life within us and
abroad," Coleridge's admonition from "The Eolian Harp."

He and most

of the other English Romantics saw a reciprocal and nearly egalitarian relationship between humanity and nature.

The static Great

Chain of Being, so vital to the West's conception of the relationship
between God, humanity and nature, was, at long last, being effectively overthrown.
lationship to change.

It took from about 1600-1800 for this basic reScientific inquiry, increasing secularization (due

in great part to scientific inquiry) and societal factors were all responsible for this change, which allowed the Romantics to take the
view that perhaps Vaughan would have taken, had his age's cosmology been different--that animals and humans were not so dissimilar,
after all.

A myriad of factors are responsible for the dissolution of the
rigid boundaries between humans and nature, espoused for so long
by Christianity.

Of primary importance was the influence of science

from roughly 1600-1800.

Natural historians began to describe the

life of animals and plants as separate from the life of humankind
(Thomas 51; unless otherwise noted·, subsequent citations m

this

chapter refer to Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World). At first,
these historians did not succeed in considering nature with scientific
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detachment; they categorized nature according to human criterion or
values.

For example, Linnaeus' new system for classification, ac-

cepted in England in the 1760s, was a step forward for science; however, he classified animals and plants in "tribes" and "nations" and
"kingdoms," still reflecting the anthropocentric view of his times (65).
He freely mingled adjectives such as loathsome and disgusting with
zoological terms (69).

Other taxonomists, however, helped develop a

more scientific taxonomy.
Even more important, however, to the gradually decreasing
anthropocentrism was the new Latin terminology scientists used to
identify plants and animals (81 ).

This terminology replaced the ver-

nacular names the country folk had used to identify the natural
world.

The vernacular names were discarded for many reasons, one

being that some were just too vulgar (i.e. plant names like "naked
ladies" and "pissabed" or "shitabed") (85).

The new terminology fos-

tered the new scientific mindset, a stauch and unyielding one at that.
Botanist John Berkenhout remarked in 1789, "Those who wish to remain ignorant of the Latin language, have no business with the study
of botany" (87).

Keith Thomas firmly believes that the new termi-

nology did the most to destroy anthropocentrism:
In place of a natural world redolant with human
analogy and symbolic meaning, and sensitive to
man's behavior, they [the scientists] constructed a
detached natural scene to be viewed and studied by
the observer from the outside, as if by peering
through a window, in the secure know ledge that the
objects of contemplation inhabited a separate
realm, offering no omens or signs, without human
meaning or significance. (89)
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Nature was nature, not a reflection of human needs and concerns, as

it had been prior to about 1600.
Other scientific developments

overturned previous

assump-

tions based on the Christian orthodox belief that the earth and everything on it had been made for humankind's express purpose.
Astronomers enlarged the conception of the universe, making it more
difficult for humans to regard the world as made solely for our use
(167).

Microscopes revealed an oppositional world to the one discov-

ered with the assistance of telescopes--one of bacteria and other
minute organisms of which humans had never conceived (167).
Anthropocentrism was further destroyed by investigation from the
geologic community.

By 1820, geologists were united in their belief

that the earth's age was not a matter of thousands of years, as
Biblical study had lead the West to believe, but of millions (186).
This meant that the Bible had been proven wrong by the rational
faculty of humans--a tremendous blow to Augustinian faith.

The

study of fossils and bones seemed to support Darwin's evolutionary
theories.
The doctrine of evolution seemed to sound the death knell for
the anthropocentric mindset,

at least from

the

scientific

front.

Darwin's Origin of the Species (1859) introduced the theory of natural selection.

In 1871, his Descent of Man argued that humans and

animals were descended from a common ancestor.

The implications

of both were simple: the Book of Genesis' version of creation was, at
the very least, not literally true, and. ·that God was not necessary to
explain creation.
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On a societal level, as well, many changes occured from 16001800 to put anthropocentrism to rest.

Although many laborers had

always felt relatively close to their working animals, often naming
particular cows and horses, it was not until pets became popular in
the 1700s that animals became highly regarded by the general citizenry (121).

Dogs were the most popular pet in England for this time

period (101).

Pets in the home allowed people to obtain an intimate

look at the animal world, and their conclusions were favorable:
"There is no doubt that it was the observation of household pets
which buttressed [scientific] claims for animal intelligence and character" (121).
In the eighteenth century, a concern for the welfare of animals
was part of the broader movement involving increasingly compassionate views humanity toward those segments of society once
loathed, such as the criminal and the insane ( 184).

Previously,

England had been renowned for such cruel sports as bear-baiting and
cock-fighting, among many others.

In the 1700s, increasing compas-

sion for animals was evident primarily in the educated and the upper class (not always members of the same class), but the movement
influenced the general population and became a relatively popular
cause, as evidenced by the founding in 1824 of the Royal Society for
the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (180).

It is interesting to note,

however, that those most concerned with cruelty to animals were
not, paradoxically, those most in contact with animals, the laboring
class (182).

It would be very hard indeed to be a farm-laborer, con-

stantly needing to urge on a horse in the field, and remain concerned
about the animal's rights.
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Other societal factors which helped end anthropocentrism were

the growth of towns and increasing industrialism (181).

Both of

these factors helped to create a world in which animals were increasingly marginal; therefore, urban expansion fostered the environment
necessary for the "animals-have-rights-too" mentality.
This sketch is but the most cursory summary of the many scientific and societal factors which overthrew the earlier Christian
view that the world was made for humans and that all of nature was
created by God to serve us.

My purpose has been to give only a fla-

vor of the many scientific and societal factors at work, for a clear delineation of every factor is outside the scope of this study.

The m-

creasmg influence of science and developments not on the intellectual level but throughout the population in general did their part to
destroy the old mindset.

Religious factors, as well, had a profound

effect on the old mindset, often exacerbating its dissolution.
Christianity had always espoused man's (not humankind's)
authority over the natural world.

The Biblical account of the early

relationship between God, humankind and nature is as follows: before the Fall, humans and the natural world lived m a paradise ruled
by God's special appointee, Adam.
isted peacefully together.

Animals and humankind co-ex-

But the Fall degenerated humankind, ani-

mals, plants, indeed everything including the soil itself, creating a
newly-hostile world.

Animals became fierce and unruly, but God re-

stated man's authority over the animal world.

This authority al-

lowed man to do whatever he liked with animals, and claim divine
permission.

Animals could be beaten, killed and exploited in every
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conceivable fashion, and God, supposedly, would acknowledge and

bless it.

Humankind ruled the world and everything in it.

As I have summarized, scientific and societal factors led to the
very destruction of this mindset by 1800.

Christianity itself inadver-

tently helped to destroy the old anthropocentrism.
sponding

to

Christianity's

scientific

advances

representatives

their discoveries.

with

vehemently

an

Instead of re-

inquisitive

attacked

attitude,

scientists

for

Furthermore, they adopted a very closed mindset,

which Whitehead likens to a garrison of a fort surrounded by hostile
enemies (189), withdrawing into themselves.

Instead of engaging in

a dialogue with scientists to discover the unknown truth about the
origin of the universe, they presented the world with an "either-or"
dilemma--either one believed "us," or one believed "them."

Thus, it

is easy to understand the reaction of the intellectual community, in
the face of all the overwhelming scientific evidence--to place less
credence, less faith, in religion.

The skepticism among the intellec-

tual elite was becoming, slowly, more secular than it had ever been
before.

And if Christianity was invalid, so were, logically, its

premises, one of them being the superiority of humans over nature.
The term Enlightenment is a biased one, when used to refer to
the eighteenth-and nineteenth-century scientific discoveries.

For, m

a profound way, this age was a darkening, not a period when lights
were turned on.

Science made humanity question the very existence

of God and the validity of Christianity, foundations upon which the
West had been built.

Now the simplicity of the Augustinian world

seemed like a sick joke, and eventually led Nietzsche to pronounce

God dead.
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The light of faith was to a great extent extinguished, even

as the lights of reason and science were being turned on.
Christianity's own internal problems, outside the sphere of science, made people even more suspicious of its validity.

The domi-

nant Christian church, the Roman Catholic church, had had its problems: corruptions,

schisms, usury and so forth,

which prompted

Martin Luther, an ordained priest, to break with it.

He was the first

of a slew of Protestant reformers.

Although these attempts to "pu-

rify" Christianity were noble, from the hindsight of historical study,
they no doubt testify to an increasingly troubled and fragmented
orthodoxy.

Christianity was not even sure of itself, sometimes prolif-

erating sects over very mundane matters (for example, the start of
Anglicanism by Henry VIII over his marital and successional problems.

Anglicanism, by the way, is startlingly similar in its practices

to Roman Catholicism, showing that this church seemed to have few
quarrels with the bulk of Catholicism's teachings).
Thus religious, societal and scientific factors all played a part in
narrowing the perceived gap between humanity and nature.

By

1800, anthropocentrism was not dead, but was well on its way to
being regarded as anachronistic from the point of view of the intellectual elite, making way for the Romantic conception of linkage
between divinity, nature and humanity.

The Great Chain of Being

and Vaughan's Augustinian faith were effectively destroyed, in part
by rationality and scientific rnquuy.

But with this destruction came

a deep need for a new conception of ·faith, one that could take into
account empiricism and accept--not condemn--reason.

In the final

chapters of this study, I will focus on Romanticism and Coleridge, and

reveal

how

an

orthodox

theologian 1s

inheritance from the Age of Reason.

able

to
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assimilate his
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THE ROMANTIC REVOLUTION AND COLERIDGE

The Age of Reason dissolved the old cosmology of the Great
Chain of Being.

With the death of this concept, a need for a new faith

arose to replace the traditional Augustinian faith.

A dichotomy be-

tween faith and reason arose, as if the two could never be reconciled,
but Coleridge's challenge toward the end of his life is to do just that-to rectify seeming opposites.
This chapter in my consideration · of Coleridge shows, in a general manner, how the Romantics, including Coleridge, revolted against
their inheritance from the Age of Reason, particularly in relation to
the treatment of nature.

In the next chapter, I focus on his nature

theories, on lessons perceivable to persons very receptive and open
to nature, and on his conception of immanence, while, in the final
chapter of my consideration of Coleridge, I demonstrate his struggle
to conceive a new faith accountable to the value placed on rational
knowledge in his age.

The Romantics "revolted" against the mechanistic mindset and
rationality of the period in which they lived.

They sought an organic

wholeness, against the mechanist view that nature consisted of
forces, or, as Tennyson was to say, that the "stars blindly run"
(Whitehead 77).

Of all the English Romantics, it is Wordsworth that

Whitehead considers the representative of the typical Romantic response

to

the

machine-world

mindset

(77).

Wordsworth

was

"morally repulsed" by the eighteenth-century viewpoint that science
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could be accepted at face value; he was convinced that something
was missing, and that "something" was the thing of most importance
(77).

He looked for unity in a world that sought so vehemently to

chop apart, to dissect.

As Whitehead believes, Wordsworth dwelt

upon "the mysterious presence of surrounding things," which imposes itself upon any individual part of nature that is held up for its
own sake (83).
One of the most important facets of the Romantic revolution
against the old cosmology was its concentration upon nature instead
of God.

Perhaps it was a way of coping with the doubts about the

existence of God that science . had inevitably raised.

It certainly is

part

Wordsworth's

of the

secularization

of the

modern

era.

Excursion, meant to be "a philosophical poem containing views of
Man, Nature, and Society," begins thus: " 'Twas summer, and the sun
had mounted high" (Whitehead 81).

Whitehead finds the fact that

the poem begins with an image of nature to be reflective of the
Romantic revolution (81).

Nature, not God, 1s emphasized; whereas,

before Romanticism, this had not been the case.

Marjorie Hope

Nicolson, in Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory: The Aesthetics of

the Infinite, argues convincingly that the Romantics climaxed the
historical development of what she terms the "aesthetics of the
infinite," or "the transfer of Infinity and Eternity from a God of
Power and a God of Benignity to Space, then to the grandeur and
majesty of earth" (393).

In other words, humans have a real need

for the vast, the eternal, the incomprehensible.

This yearning was

initially entirely satiated by the concept of God.

As the concept of

God began to be questioned openly by the West, however, this need
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began to be filled by seeing what had previously been the sole
domain of God in nature.

Certain aspects of nature, like mountains

(her specific interest in this book), began to represent the unknown
affirmation humans needed so desperately.

This transfer of validity

from God to nature, again, is part of modern secularization, and
brings up the prospect of pantheism, an idea Coleridge flirted with
openly but never took seriously.
An excellent example of the "aesthetics of the infinite" is m The

Prelude:
The immeasurable height
Of woods decaying, never to be decayed,
The stationary blasts of waterfalls
And in the narrow rent at every turn
Winds thwarting winds, bewildered and forlorn,
The rocks that muttered close upon our ears,
Black drizzling crags that spake by the way-side
As if a voice were in them, the sick sight
And giddy prospect of the raving stream,
The unfettered clouds and regions of the Heavens,
Tumult and peace, the darkness and the lightWere all like workings of one mind, the features
Of the same face, blossoms upon one tree;
Characters of the great Apocalypse,
The types and symbols of Eternity,
Of first, and last, and midst, and without end.
(VI, lines 624-40 [393])
Vastness is expressed in the woods' "immeasurable height" (l.624).
The clouds and the regions of Heaven are "unfettered" (l.633), an image of wildness.

"Tumult and peace, the darkness and the light"

(l.634) are images of opposites which evoke vastness; there is a long
way between darkness and light, for . instance.

The workings of na-

ture are the "types and symbols of Eternity" (l.639).

Infinity 1s ex-

pressed in "Of first, and last, and midst, and without end" (l.640),
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remniscent of God's declaration: "I am the Alpha and the Omega."
Vastness, infinity and eternity are thus all in nature, all expressions
of an incomprehensible power.

Nicolson, however, also argues that

these features of the unknown and unseen in nature do not reveal
the

ultimate reality:

they

essentially reflect

God

(393).

The

Romantics have certainly not "given up on God" but are apparently
searching for concrete expressions of His being, and they find this
confirmation to a great extent in nature.
Another aspect of the Romantic revolution ts its view of nature's mutability and irregularity.

Previous to Romanticism, nature

was viewed as orderly, what Nicolson refers to as the "classical
canons of regularity, symmetry and proportion" (15).

Vaughan, for

instance, had very little to say of the possibility of a wild and irregular nature.

Such a possibility would have horrrified him.

Romantics,

however,

asymmetry,

which

delighted 1n

to

"other" than humankind.

some

nature's

unpredictability

extent represented

nature

as

The
and
being

These poets did not strive to impose the

human value of order upon nature; they recognized this codification
as false.

They saw nature "as it is," a wild existence, defying our

wishes for comfortable conformity.

Although in this limited sense

the Romantics separated themselves from nature, their predominant
tendency, as we shall see, was to see the common bonds of humanity
and nature, the spectacular "one Life."
In his early years, Coleridge was infatuated with nature, as all
the English Romantics were. In the 1790s he produced much nature
poetry, some of it excellent, but as most critics would attest, not
achieving the level of perfection his friend and associate, W ordworth,
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He associated with other Romantics, constantly con-

would attain.

versing about crucial issues of the time and living a life of high intellectual excitement.

A new age was upon them, the Romantics felt

sure, and the French Revolution was but a portent of great things to
come, an impending age of "universal felicity" (64), in the words -of
M.H. Abrams.

This period of the pantisocratic scheme was not only a

plan to create a situation where a new spirit of brotherhood would
thrive, but also involved a theory of nature as well (Beer, Poetical
Intelligence 43).

For the community would be situated near a nver,

and husbandry in nature would be the means of survival (43).

Thus

Coleridge's nature theories were initially closely linked with this
practical scheme.

This scheme did not take long to fail; however, this

failure of the utopian plan seems to have had little effect on his
nature theories, as reflected in the poems that I will discuss m the
next chapter.
The thoughts of Coleridge's friend Hucks, as recorded m his
journal, reveal the mindset regarding nature of those young radical
Romantics.

Hucks' journal describes the walking-tour of 1794 that

he and Coleridge engaged in, before the pantisocratic plan fell
through (Beer, Poetical

Intelligence 42).

The fact that both were

walking and not riding in a stagecoach itself shows the new "spirit of
the age," in that, significantly, all men were equal; no man should be
presumptuous enough elevate himself falsely by usmg a carnage
(42).

The idea of the walking-tour also reflects the new relationship

between humanity and nature, "his would be a most comfortless
state of existence, with a mind that could have no idea, if at all, of the
deity" (42).

That nature was reflective of God was an idea, according
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to that Coleridge critic, John Beer, not atypical of Coleridge and his
peers (42).

Moreover, humans needed nature.

As I have shown, the Romantics view nature m a new manner,
usually concentrating upon nature instead of God, but they are
neither atheists nor pantheists--nature can in fact serve as a statement of His being. Romantic nature theories conceive nature, humanity and divinity as vitally connected with one spirit.

In the fol-

lowing chapter, I outline Coleridge's nature theories and reveal how
these theories operate in his nature poetry and prose and discuss
Coleridge's version of immanence.
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COLERIDGE'S NATURE THEORIES AND IMMANENCE

I have shown that Vaughan's concept of immanence was of an
uncomplicated, reflected divinity in nature.

As I discuss in this

chapter, in the 1790s, Coleridge sees immanence in much the same
manner as Vaughan: nature as reflected divinity.

Because of his

rational inheritance from the Age of Reason, Coleridge is finally able
to see an immanence of a broader kind; nature did not simply reflect
divinity, but, as he believes after he eschews his nature theories,
nature can reflect divinity only with human intellectual intervention.
His version of immanence is practically realized when a receptive
person immerses himself or herself in the natural world, commumng
not only with nature, but with God.

Coleridge comes to believe

eventually that the mind is required to do this in any real sense, as I
argue in the next chapter.
I believe Coleridge's immanence allows nature to serve a didactic function for humankind, the purpose of which is to demonstrate nature's beauty, joy and spirituality.

This spirituality is in-

deed the ultimate lesson to be learned from Coleridge's conversation
poems.

I will first address conceptually Coleridge's nature theories,

then show these theories at work in six of his poetry and prose
works.
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Coleridge had literally an assortment of theories regarding nature, some rather complex, during the idealistic decade before about
1800.

These idealistic years witnessed a Coleridge who conceived a

simple immanence similar to Vaughan's immanence.

Nature could

reflect divinity, if one were open to this revelation, but the rational
faculty need not intervene. This immanence was more of a feeling.
Later Coleridge, however, was to separate himself from nature and
view to rationality as absolutely critical to this process of immanence.

He thus eventually will uphold the need for reason, despite

Romantic denunciations of the rationalistic mindset; but, as I have
already discussed, Coleridge never really did entirely escape the
mechanistic mindset to which much of the West was still subject in
the late 1700s.
I will concentrate on but a few of his nature theories.

Coleridge

believed, firstly, in the reciprocal and nearly egalitarian relationship
between humanity and nature, the "one Life within us and abroad."
Graham

Davidson

believes

this

to

be

the

dominant

quest

of

Coleridge's career: "where Coleridge finds a sense of unity in diverse
phenomena, he also senses the presence of the divine spirit" (20).
"The Eolian Harp" conveys his desire to see what the Cambridge
Platonists referred to as the "plastic power" of the universe.
One of his most sincere desires was to be able to find a tangible
basis for his sense of "oneness" in the world.

In his desire to dis-

cover an explanation, he temporarily became intrigued with magnetism and hypnotism.

The magnetists, mostly French, believed an

invisible link connected all humans to one another, and that this link
was more apparent in those who had been reared extensively in the

natural world (Beer, Poetical Intelligence 135).
doctrine for Coleridge is obvious.
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The appeal of this

Both magnetism and hypnotism

could help explain the more mysterious aspects of human nature;
both were links by which he could "hold together a series of psychological speculations and apparently supernatural phenomena" (222).
Both were concrete ways m which an unseen force could influence
human behavior.

Coleridge's infatuation with these ideas is apparent

in his poetry; "The Nightingale" contains subtle hints of magnetism,
while "Christabel" clearly has instances of hypnotism (220).

Beer

speculates that Coleridge became disenchanted with these concepts
after his visit to Germany, where he attended the lectures of
Blumenbach, a renowned physiologist in Europe (220).

Blumenbach

was a complete skeptic, and this stance no doubt made Coleridge rethink his commitment to both magnetism and hypnotism as ways of
explaining the "one Life" (220).

This fascination is but one attempt

Coleridge made to justify a belief in a divine spirit pervading the
world.
Another nature theory that Coleridge held was the Romantic
"innocent child of nature" theory.

The Romantics believed both

nature and children were innocent of the corrupt influences of adulthood and civilization.

Children were idolized for their simplicity.

They had not yet been forced by exposure to the adult world and its
values of sense and rationality to subordinate their natural instincts,
which the Romantics prized, but throughout most of history was, at
best, viewed as superfluous, at worst, something children would
quickly outgrow.

Children were also much closer to the "vision

splendid" of their pre-existence before their incarnation in this

world.
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They were much more attuned to the "one Life" than most

adults could ever be.

In his "innocent-child-of-nature" poetry,

Coleridge provides us with a vision of the child, reared in a natural
environment, able to feel this "one Life" literally ebbing through his
or her body.
Coleridge of course learned much about the behavior of children from his own children, particularly, it seems, from Hartley.

He

went so far as to take notes regarding Hartley's behavior and to
relate these to his theories.

The following observations were made m

a notebook under the heading "Infancy and Infants":
1. The first smile--what kind of reason it displays
--the first smile after· sickness.-2. Asleep with the polyanthus held fast in his hand,
its bells drooping over his rosy face.
3. Stretching after the stars.-4. Seen asleep by the light of glow worms.
5. Sports of infants--then incessant activity, the
means being the end.--Nature how lovely a
school-mistress.
(Beer, Poetical Intelligence 13 6- 7)
Of course, it is essential to remember the end toward which the
Romantic idealization of childhood strived.

The Romantics were try-

ing to view nature in a new way, to break out of stale conventions,
and children did have what M.H. Abrams calls the "freshness of sensation" (379) for which the Romantics were looking.

To think as chil-

dren thought would be a root of new creativity for the poet.

Most

Romantics did realize that childhood, as a whole, was a sterile state
(261), and therefore wanted to be . ~uccessful in carrying on "the
feelings of childhood into the powers of manhood,"

comments in Biographia Literaria (Abrams 381).

as Coleridge
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The final nature theory I will be addressing is the "nature-asministry" theory.

Coleridge was often subtle in his references to God

in his nature poems, but that does not mean that he harbored serious
doubts regarding God, not even during the 1790s, as some have
hastily asserted.

"Nature as ministry" refers to the idea that nature

itself can serve as the essential function of a church: to provide a
forum for devout worship.

Indeed, although Coleridge would never

have espoused the neglect of church-worship, he likely thought nature was in some way superior to churches for worshipping.

For if

nature reflects God, and can serve a didactic function for humans
why be "pent up" in a human-made creation? Walk outdoors instead,
and immerse oneself in the divinity,· keeping a very open and receptive attitude, thus practically realizing immanence.

The following ex-

cerpt from "To Nature" is an excellent example of nature as ministry:
So will I build my altar in the fields,
And the blue sky my fretted dome shall be.
And the sweet fragrance that the wild flower yields
Shall be the incense I will yield to Thee,
Thee only God! and thou shalt not despise
Even me, the priest of this poor sacrifice.
(Beer, Visionary 224)
Coleridge's alleged pantheism seems to still be an issue for
critics, and the final word shall certainly not be said here.
however, found no evidence of firm pantheistic beliefs.

I have,

A flirtation?

Certainly, and one that seemed relatively serious during his output of
nature poetry in the 1790s.

But a flirtation does not a conviction

make, and there is little reason to doubt his assertion at Highgate late
in his life," With my heart I never did abandon the name of Christ"
(Brett 223).

"The Foster-Mother's Tale,"
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a dramatic fragment from his

tragedy Osorio, 1s an unremarkable story, except for its demonstration of several of Coleridge's nature theories.

The tale revolves

around an "innocent child of nature" who remains unnamed, to show
his belonging to the natural world, as names are a false creation of
humankind.

The child is found beneath a tree "wrapt m mosses,

lined l With thistle-beards" (1.24-5) by a woodsman.

By including no

evidence of any one having abandoned the child, Coleridge creates
this child as the ultimate "child of nature"; it seems possible, within
the context of the story, for the earth itself to have given birth to
him.

Coleridge furthers this picture of the child by having him

initially be

"most unteachable"

(l.30) in conventional religious

practices, but instead the child soon reveals his alliance with nature;
he whistles as the birds do and shows his creative force by planting
flowers.

He is only able to learn to read and write by instruction

from a friar.

The fact that a spiritual man is the only one able to

teach the natural child reveals the link between nature and religion.
This conventional teaching, however, is the beginning of a corrupting
process for the child, as he is drawn further and further away from
his natural origins, and further into adult civilization's expectations.
He now lives at the convent or the castle and becomes "a very
learned youth" (l.42).

All his reading, however, "turns" his brains,

until he has "unlawful thoughts" (l.45).

Coleridge never specifies

what these thoughts are, but presumably they are thoughts not
conducive to the functioning of society.

The child, who is now nearly

twenty, retains his "natural world consciousness," for although he
enjoys praying, he dislikes praying "With holy men, nor in a holy

place" (l.47).
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Finally, the earth itself protests his adaptation into

society, as it heaves under the child and his benefactor, collapsing
the chapel almost on top of them.

This quasi-narrative reveals the

reciprocal relationship between the boy and nature; the boy has
always worshipped nature, and nature has loved him, and now nature wants him back as truly one of her own.
And nature does get him back.

The youth is put into a dungeon

after he misinterprets the chapel's collapse, believing it to be God's
protest of his "unlawful thoughts"

(his misinterpretation of the

chapel's collapse shows how far he has deteriorated from oneness
with nature).

He is let out of the dungeon, becomes an explorer and,

in America, escapes into the wilds,· living "among the savage men"
(l.81).

The "one Life" between humanity and nature 1s especially pronounced in this child.

He evidently feels an acute connection to na-

ture even m his farthest deviation from his natural life.

Nature calls

him back to the home from whence he originally came.

He probably

is very contented living with Indians, for they have remained uncontaminated by the corrupting influences of civilization (or so Coleridge
would see it).

The idea that humans decline from an original virtue

by contact with civilization is attributable to Rousseau's idea of the
"noble savage." (Beer, Poetical Intelligence 27).

Coleridge thus paral-

lels the innocence of the child, nature and the New World.
The child treats nature as a ministry.

He knows nature reflects

God (immanence, not pantheism) and . that to simply be in nature is a
suitable worship of God.

He dislikes praying in churches.

Perhaps

Coleridge is saying that churches are a false human construct, or that

"holy

men"

are

often

hypocrites

or

just

generally
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corrupt.

Significantly, the child was originally found under a tree, and that
same tree was used to build the chapel which caved in on the boy.
This particular tree apparently has a special connection to the child,
as odd as that sounds, for it is part of the collapsed chapel, and seems
to have "recognized" the gradual degeneration of the child, and collapsed with the earth's movement.

Although the prospect of trees

"recognizing" human beings takes us into a most unorthodox train of
thought, Coleridge's emphasis on this particular tree in this way can
have no other explanation.

Except, perhaps, that the tree itself was

protesting its usage in a church, but this seems unlikely, for the boy
would be left completely out of the collapse.
The final scene in "The Foster-Mother's Tale" includes the
child's rebellion against civilization, his return to nature, by a boat
"set sail by silent moonlight" (1. 79).

Beer informs us that the moon is,

for Coleridge, a transmitter of divine light (Visionary 93), and that
Coleridge uses the term moonlight to symbolize natural revelation
(118).

If this is the case (and it seems a very reasonable argument),

then Coleridge makes it clear at the conclusion that the child has
God's blessing for his return to nature.
Another rather obscure prose work exhibiting his nature theories is "The Wanderings of Cain."

The role of the "innocent child of

nature" is played by Cain's young son Enos.

Coleridge establishes this

reference by directly telling us he is an "innocent little child" (113).
His affinity with nature is evident
squirrels.

w~(1n

he attempts to play with the

His extreme naivete touchingly appears when he asks his

father Cain why the animals do not play with him: "Why, 0 my I
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father, would they not play with me?/ I would be good to them as

thou art I good to me" (113).

He has no conception of the conse-

quences of the Fall, of which his father is, of course, emblematic.
Even more important than Enos' status as the child of nature is
his role as redemptor-- he is needed to help save his sinning father.
Cain is so far "fallen" that he relies on his child to help him: "Lead on,
my child! . . . Guide me, little child!" (113).

Enos at least twice reas-

sures his father that they· will soon come into "the open moonlight"
(113), moonlight being

a

symbol of God's revelation through nature.

Enos thus gives his father to understand how close they are to
redemption.
The child also at one point grasps his sitting father, "as if he
[Enos] would raise him [Cain]" (114).
raising of Christ from the dead.
three days.

Raise has connotations of the

Cain is "dead" like Christ was for

Cain, however, is not physically dead, but is so in every

other sense of the word.

This allusion to the resurrection of Christ

also works m another way-- a dead Christ, in purgatory for three
days, is at the farthest point away from God, as is an unredeemed
Cain.
Two more instances of Enos as redemptor of his father include
an image of Abel with "the child by his right hand, and Cain by his
left" (115).

The right hand of God is the favored one; Christ assumed

this position after he was raised from the dead.

Enos' innocence ap-

parently makes him favored over his flawed father, who must sit at
Abel's left side.

When Cain begs Abel to allow him to be forgiven,

Abel acquiesces, but tells him to "bring thy child with thee!" (116).
In the triangle of Abel, Cain and Enos, the latter symbolizes
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mnocence m its purest form, of a kind that does not even realize the
consequences of the Fall, and the only kind that can help redeem sin.
It seems as if Cain, by himself, would be doomed to the hell he is in,

if not for his love for Enos.

Cain killed, the ultimate action that hate

can produce, but his love for his son stands opposed to that.

The fact

that he can love is his salvation.
Enos sees nature as a force to love.

He vainly tries to play with

the squirrels and is genuinely puzzled when they run away from
him.

He is abundantly, joyously alive, unlike his father, who wishes

more than anything to die and become part of the natural landscape
that he has so profoundly offended.

His attempt to commune with

nature fails, because of Adam and Eve's Fall, but his own father reenacts the fall in his own manner (Davidson 55).
The "one Life" concept is apparent in what Graham Davidson
calls the "symbolical landscape" that Cain and Enos inhabit, which
reveals Cain's inner life (56).
actions.

Cain is in a hell on earth, created by his

Nature and Cain's consciousness are so closely interfused

that the landscape takes on the characteristics of Cain's consciousness
m a pathetic fallacy:
The scene around was desolate . . . the bare rocks
faced each other, and left a long and wide interval
of thin white sand . . . There was no spring, no
summer, no autumn: and winter's snow, that would
have been lovely, fell not on these hot rocks and
scorching sands . . . . The pointed and shattered
summits of the ridges of the rocks made a mimicry
of human concerns. ( 114)
Certainly, this scene is a hell on earth.

This hot, dry landscape,

however, exists not on its own, but as a reflection of Cain's psycho!-

ogy; as he says "in silence am I dried up" (114).
is dried up.
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His very spirituality

He later tells Abel that he would lament for him, "but

that the spirit within me is withered, and burnt up in agony" (116).
Like the Mariner, he needs redemption, and that redemption starts
with the lamenting that he has thus far been unable to do.
"Christabel" has nearly obsessed Coleridgean critics.

Who or

what 1s Geraldine, and what exactly does she do to Christabel?
what 1s done to Christabel good or bad?

Is

Certainly, the answers to

these questions lie in a thorough examination of Geraldine, but as I
am focusing upon the "innocent child of nature" and relevant nature
theories, Christabel's character will instead be my object of my
analysis.
Clearly, Christabel represents goodness and innocence.

This

symbolism is apparent without even contrasting her to Geraldine.
She prays for her lover, she takes Geraldine into her home, and she
often raises her eyes to heaven.

Geraldine tells her, "All they who

live in the upper sky, I Do love you, holy Christabel!" (l.227-8).
Although Geraldine's general character may make what she says
questionable, she does vacillate from deviousness to a state of goodness approaching that of Christabel.

Because she has just drank from

the "wine of virtuous powers (l.191) made by Christabel's mother,
she has just shifted into her "good persona," and therefore her comment 1s sincere and believable.
Upon being awakened by Geraldine, she realizes that she has
sinned, but she wants to atone, "Now heaven be praised if all be
well!" (l.382).
night.

She prays to Christ to forgive her sins of the prev10us

Coleridge emphasizes her continuing innocence near the end

of the poem.
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She is "So fair, so innocent, so mild" (l.624), with eyes

"so innocent and blue" (l.612).

Furthermore, at least twice Coleridge

directly invokes divine personages (Jesus and Mary)

to protect

Christabel, the force of good falling subject to evil, or, at the very
least, disruption, as Kathleen M. Wheeler maintains m a very poststructuralist reading (87).

Thus, Coleridge goes to great lengths to

make sure the reader sees Christabel as innocent and generally
"good," and that she continues to be so, despite her infatuation with
Geraldine.
Christabel's affinity with nature 1s most apparent when she
leaves the castle, a universe of death, for the woods to pray.

Like

Enos, she is very much alive in her father's world of death, and she
leaves to escape into a world to which she feels closer.
acutely the "one Life" between nature and her.

She feels

Both are a live,

something Christabel's closest companion, her father, is essentially
not.
Beer maintains that the powers of nature are working at so low
an ebb as to be almost nonexistent (Poetical

Intelligence 186).

The

pulsation of life in the woods is there, but one would need to use a
stethoscope to detect it.

This low spiritual energy 1s evident in the

following lines from the scene of Christabel praying in nature:
There is not wind enough in the air
To move away the ringlet curl
From the lovely lady's cheek-There is not wind enough to twirl
The one red leaf, the last of its clan. (45-9)
Of the six nature poems I will explore, "Christabel" was written
last, in 1801, when Coleridge's faith in his nature theories was be-

gmnmg to falter.
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The "one Life" theory applies here, but nature's life

does appear dim, as opposed to the absolutely joyous nature represented in the conversation poems.

Never again would he write a

child of nature poem; he was moving on to different intellectual horizons, as I will show.
Although Beer's observation above is excellent, he is less on the
mark when he affirms that Christabel has a strong bond with nature
because she is constantly forced to look up into the sky for her dead
mother's spirit (Poetical Intelligence 191).

This claim is absurd.

Yes,

Christabel does often "raise her eyes to heaven," and perhaps part of
the reason that she is doing so 1s to get in touch with her deceased
mother.

But to then extend the argument to say that because of

these factors, she has a bond with nature, is stretching too far.
Christabel significantly decides to pray in nature, an example of
the "nature-as-ministry" theme.

She knows a church is not required

on order to have God hear her prayers.

This poem, in its explicit as-

sertion is different from others exhibiting nature as ministry, where
a simple nature walk is worship of God.

Christabel actually kneels

beneath an oak tree, clasps her hands and prays.
difference lies in her specific prayers for her lover.

Perhaps the

It is also possible

that Christabel is more orthodox than Coleridge's other characters,
such as the child in "The Foster-Mother's Tale."

The medieval setting

points to this distinct possibility, as does the number of times
Christabel prays.

Coleridge is also pointing to religious orthodoxy in

his repeated "Jesu, Maria, shield her well!" (l.54,582).

Even such a

devout worshipper, however, sees the benefit of nature as a forum
for prayer.
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The conversation poems, written between 1795 and 1798, fit
Coleridge's nature theories especially well.

Raimonda Modiano says

they show that nature has an affinity with and permeates human
unconscious life (56).

Graham Davidson feels that all of Coleridge's

conversation poems reveal a desire to understand how
things can participate in the "one Life" (43).

separate

However, "This Lime-

tree Bower My Prison," "Frost at Midnight" and "The Nightingale" also
reveal a nature capable of modeling lessons, the ultimate aim of
which is to know God.

Nature serves a didactic function for humans,

as it does in Vaughan's Silex Scintillans, and, akin to Vaughan's immanence, Coleridge's version of immanence evokes nature's didactic1sm.

The nature of the lessons, however, differ in the two cases.

Coleridge's purpose is not to affirm humanity's privileged status on
earth, but to demonstrate nature's essential joy, beauty and spirituality.
"The Nightingale," like "Christabel," contains a young woman as
a child of nature.

She is a "most gentle Maid" (l.69), who is "like a

Lady vowed and dedicate I To something more than Nature in the
grove" (1.72-3).

This simile brings to mind a nun, a woman whose

life is dedicated to God.

She is a nun m a sense, but she makes her

devotions in the woods, not in a church; nature is her ministry.

She

knows all the notes of the nightingales intimately, revealing a close
contact and knowledge of nature.

Besides the hint of the· maid being

like a nun, Coleridge creates this scene in another way to bring an
image of church to the reader's mind by having the nightingales
"burst forth in choral minstrelsy" (1.80).

The nightingales sing joy-

ously in response to the moon's re-appearance from behind a cloud.
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Their response to the moon indicates the "one Life" theory between
the moon and the birds.
imagery in the scene.

This supposition is evidenced by the Eolian

The birds "Have all burst forth in choral min-

strelsy, I As if some sudden gale had swept at once I A hundred airy
harps!" (1.80-2).

A kindred spirit pulsates through all of nature,

making the nightingales respond to the moon, and the mind so familiar with the nightingales' song that she "knows all their notes" (l.74).
This scene shows Coleridge's flirtation with the idea of magnetism.

He sought to ground the "one Life" theory with a scientific

basis, showing his eighteenth-century inheritance.

Was it possible

that the moon exercised a magnetic influence over animals and humans, as the French magnetists had suggested?

Coleridge's answer,

m this poem, is "yes."
The next scene in the poem shows an even clearer instance of
magnetism.

Coleridge takes his "innocent nature child," Hartley, into

the woods one night while the baby is crying.

The child responds

immediately to the moon:
And he beheld the moon, · and, hushed at once,
Suspends his sobs, and laughs most silently,
While his fair eyes, that swam with undropped tears,
Did glitter in the yellow moon-beam! (l.102-5)
The moon, also, is a symbol of divinity revealed through nature for
Coleridge, so Hartley and the nightingales are, apparently, also responding to the revelation of God.

Nature is, again, ministry.

Hartley knows instinctively that nature is a force with which to
commune.

Coleridge speculates that . if Hartley were accompanymg

the W ordsworths and him, the child would place his hand to his ear
and bid them listen to the nightingales.

For the nightingales, as part

58
of nature, serve a didactic function for Hartley, for the maid, for
Coleridge and the Wordsworths, for poets; indeed, for all who listen
and observe it.
The nightingales show us that "In Nature there is nothing
melancholy" (l.15).

This distance from a fallen sense of nature is the

"different lore" Coleridge speaks of in line 41.

Coleridge and William

and Dorothy Wordsworth know that nature "is always full of love I
And joyance" (1.42-3), rather than the poetic conceit of the melancholy nightingale.

A poet should learn the true essence of the

natural world by "surrendering his whole spirit" (1.29) to it, absent of
pre-judgement.

Only then can poets represent nature as it is,

suggests Coleridge, the way the innocent children of nature, like
Hartley and the maid, and the "different lore" poets know it to be; a
celebration of joy, and more importantly, reflective of divinity.
"The Nightingale" is full of religious references.

Coleridge does

not want to "profane" (l.41) "Nature's sweet voices" (l.42).

The

nightingale has a "soul" (l.48) which wants to release its music.

The

birds enliven the air with "harmony" (l.62), "murmurs musical" (1.60)
and "one low piping sound more sweet than all" (l.61), remniscent of
a church choir.

The similarity of the birds' song to a church choir is

confirmed in the scene in which the birds respond to the moon,
singing jubilantly in "choral minstrelsy" (l.80).

The birds smg in the

"moonlight" (l.64 ), Coleridge's symbol to denote God reflected in
nature.

Thus Coleridge, from the very beginning of the poem, wants

us to associate nature with religion and God.

He never explicitly says

that nature reflects God, but the spirituality of the poem as well as
his employment of the nature-as-ministry theory make his intention
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clear.

The ultimate aim of this poem, the final and most important

lesson, is that nature reflects God.

The lesson of nature's joy pales in

comparison to the lesson of reflected divinity.
In contrast to "The Nightingale," in which Coleridge knows the
lessons of nature from the start of the poem, "This Lime-tree Bower

My Prison" begins with a dejected Coleridge, stuck in his "prison,"
feeling as if he has "lost I Beauties and feelings" (1.2-3).

He envies

his friends, whom he believes "wander in gladness" (1.8), for some
imagined difference betwen his situation and theirs.

His dejection is

reflected in the natural scene he conjures to his mind:
The roaring dell, o'erwooded, narrow, deep,
And only speckled by the mid-day sun;
Where its slim trunk the ash from rock to rock
Flings arching like a bridge;-- that branchless ash
Unsunned and damp, whose few poor yellow leaves
Ne'er tremble in tha gale, yet tremble still,
Fanned by the water-fall! and there my friends
Behold the dark green file of long lank weeds,
That at all once (a most fantastic sight!)
Still nod and drip beneath the dripping edge
Of the blue clay-stone. (1.10-20)
(Beer, Poetical Intelligence 127)
There seems to be very little life in this scene.

The few leaves

trembling and the weeds dripping are about the total of the force of
life.

This directly corresponds to the depression of the speaker,

showing the reciprocity of the life force between Coleridge and nature.

The natural scene depends upon Coleridge's state of mind, as

his state of mind is affected by the natural scene.
As he continues to imagine his friends wandering, his mood
improves, as he thinks of different natural scenes.
to think of the glory and joy of nature.

Slowly, he begins

He no longer thinks of drip-
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pmg weeds, but of burning clouds, the ocean and purple flowers, all
doing their utmost to impress Coleridge's friend Charles Lamb.

His

increasing good spirits are reflected in the number of exclamation
points he uses while describing this new scene (a total of seven
.

between lines 31 and 37).

-

Finally, he admits "A delight I Comes sud-

den on my heart, and I am glad I As I myself were there!" (1.44-6).
Coleridge is quite explicit in his attribution of a didactic function to nature.

He realizes that the lime-tree bower has beauty too

and spends thirteen lines (1. 47-59) describing its radiance.
says, "Henceforth I shall know" (1.59).

Then he

Clearly, he has learned some-

thing from nature, and that is "That Nature ne'er deserts the wise
and pure; I No plot so narrow, be but Nature there" (1.59-60).

No

place is devoid of nature, and its capacity to "employ I Each faculty
of sense, and keep the heart I Awake to Love and Beauty!" (1.62-4).
He thus openly acknowledges that his contemplation of the natural
beauties m the bower have led him to a realization that nature is
everywhere when one is outdoors; no place is superior over any
other place, because they are all beautiful.
The real lesson, however, is that nature reflects God.

Like "The

Nightingale," "This Lime-tree Bower My Prison" is replete with religious references in connection with nature.
der the "wide wide Heaven" (l.21).

His friends wander un-

The scene, consisting of hills and

the sea, is a "many-steepled tract magnificent" (l.22); in other words,
nature serves as both church and sacred text.

Later in the poem,

Coleridge blesses a rook, believing it was seen by Charles.
Even more strikingly, he says he has stood "silent with sw1mmmg sense" (l.39), gazing until nature seems "of such hues I As veil

61
the Almighty Spirit, when yet he makes I Spirits perceive his presence" (l.41-3).

This simile, in simpler terms, means that the colors of

nature are like the colors of God when he makes himself manife.st..
This simile gets to the heart of immanence: nature shows the exis..

tence of God, but nature is not God.

-

Coleridge does not say that the

colors of nature are those that veil God.

He is not a pantheist.

But he

is saying that a contemplation of nature is a way to see the divine.
Graham Davidson argues that for omnipresence to be known m
this poem, the senses must swim (29).

Only until the observer has

drunken deeply of nature, so much so that his senses are almost offbalance, can the divine be perceived.

Here, unlike the other conver-

sation poems, the individual forms of nature are not enough (29).
This claim is entirely plausible, especially when the lines "gaze till all
doth

seem I

Less

gross

than

bodily"

(l.40-1)

are

considered.

Coleridge seems to strain a bit here; one imagines him gazing at
nature for a long time until the divine is sensed.

Yes, divinity is

sensed, and that is the true lesson of nature, but it requires an extra
bit of work in this poem to arrive there.
In contrast to "This Lime-tree Bower My Prison," "Frost at

Midnight' begins with a sense of the divine in nature in the very first
line, "The Frost performs its secret ministry."
with

a conviction of divinity in nature,

Thus Coleridge begins
as he does in

"The

Nightingale," whereas in "This Lime-tree Bower My Prison" he arrives at the conviction through the course of the poem.
Coleridge sits and contemplates .at midnight in his cottage.
is quiet, and his infant son Hartley is by his side.

All

Seeing flint flap in

the grate, he thinks of his school days, where the same scene would
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bring to his mind visions of home, and a hope of seeing family or
friends.

His contemplation of his early years as a child playing with

his sister brings him to address the sleeping Hartley.

He tells Hartley

that "thou shalt learn far other lore" (1.50), which bears the same
meaning as the "different lore" of "The Nightingale," education m
nature, not in a city, "pent 'mid cloisters dim" (1.52), like the poets of
"The Nightingale."

The purpose of such an education becomes

quickly and vividly apparent; nature will reveal to him:
The lovely shapes and sounds intelligible
Of that eternal language which thy God
Utters, who from eternity doth teach
Himself in all, and all things in himself.
Great Universal Teacher! he shall mould
Thy spirit , and by giving make it ask. (1.59-64)
This passage is the most explicit of any conversation poem m
explaining Coleridge's greatest aim in these poems: to make the
reader believe that nature models lessons.

The purpose of these

lessons is the knowledge of God.
The above passage, in a simpler form, says that God utters an
"eternal language" (l.60), and that language is nature.

All things m

nature reflect God: "Himself in all, and all things in himself" (l.62).
God is a "Great Universal Teacher" (l.63), who will make Hartley
eager for more knowledge by the very presence of nature.

Coleridge

thus represents God as teacher, communicating to humankind his
essence and presence through the medium of nature.

Hartley will be

student, as any person could be, who is willing to observe nature.
This observance itself is an act of worship, for it serves one function
that churches serve, essentially, to make God's presence known.

This

role is made explicit in the twice-repeated phrase, "secret ministry"

(l.1,72) of frost.

Ministry
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means functions of a minister; frost

performs the functions of a minister, to communicate religion to
people.

Ministry also means the agency by which something is com-

municated.

It is "secret" because no one literally witnesses the
.. formation of frost.
Why Coleridge used frost to represent all of
nature is here a cogent question.

Frost covers everything when it

appears, so perhaps this makes it suitable to represent all of nature.
The final scene sheds some light on the spiritual symbolism of the
frost.

The frost "hangs" water "up in silent icicles" (1.73), which are

"Quietly shining to the quiet Moon" (l.74).

First, the moon is a symbol

of divine revelation through nature, thus summing up the importance of the poem in a single, final image.

Second, the reader is left

with three images of coldness in the last three lines--frost, icicles and
the moon.

The moon is cold and pure, as are the frost and icicles

which "shine to" (l.74) the moon.

This shining and the similarities

between frost, icicles and the moon communicate an affinity between
the earthly icicles and the moon, and, as Ronald A. Sharp has pointed
out, a reciprocal relationship (40).

The moon also represents perfec-

tion, the original state of humankind, because it has not been subject
to the Fall like earth has been.

Thus in the last lines of "Frost at

Midnight," perhaps Coleridge is expressing a desire for perfection
here on earth, the utmost spiritual experience--the Second Coming of
Christ.
Nature's

spirituality, its connection to the divine,

is

thus

Coleridge's early and rather simplistic. version of immanence, a theory he will reject when he rejects his Romantic nature theories.

The

final chapter in my consideration of Coleridge will explore why
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Coleridge begins to view Immanence differently after about 1800

'

and how this new conception of immanence Is a response to the emphasis placed on rationality in his age, and how this new Immanence
helps to rectify reason and religion.
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COLERIDGE'S RECTIFICATION OF REASON AND FAITH

I find Coleridge's conception of immanence to be based on
-

reason in a way Vaughan would have rejected, certainly when he followed his

11

Augustinian strain of thought.

11

This immanence is a cru-

cial part of his rationalist faith, his attempt to be an orthodox
Christian, but to answer the great skepticism to which Augustinian
faith was increasingly falling prey.
faith,

I understand this rationalist

however, to never devalue mystery, for,

despite the trust

placed in rationality in the Age of Reason, there were still things we
could never understand.

The age Coleridge was born into allowed

him to view immanence and faith, those critical constituents of his
rationalist faith, as necessarily related in order to do both faith and
reason justice.

Oddly enough, Coleridge, in my view, favored faith; he

wanted so desperately to believe, to be truly orthodox, as my consideration of Conjessions of an Inquiring Spirit bears out.
I briefly examine Confessions in this chapter, exploring specifically the doctrine of the Bible's total verbal inspiration, part of the
11

Bibliolatry

11

he so despised.

Akin to his view of nature, he wanted

the Bible to be a living document.

I trace and describe Coleridge's

loss of faith rn his nature theories, examining theories as to why he
rejected this aspect of Romanticism.

Coleridge, during these early years, fully believed in the power
of nature to reveal the divine.

During the lectures of 1795, at age 23,

he stated confidently, "The Omnipotent has unfolded to us the vol-
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ume of the world, that there we may read the Transcript of Himself"
(Davidson 21).

But by 1818 his belief had changed.

The revelation

was forthcoming:
Then will the other great Bible of God, the Book of
Nature, become transparent to us, when we regard
the form of matter as words, as symbols, valuable
only as being the expression, an unrolled yet glorious fragment , of the wisdom of the Supreme Being.
(21 [italics my own])
Why had Coleridge lost faith in his nature theories?
happened?

What had

Why had nature gone from a path to God to a "wary,

wily, long-breathed old witch" (Beer, Visionary 289), as he stated in
a letter in 1825, at the age of 53?
There are a multitude of possible reasons.

He seems to have

given up on trying to find the exact means by which the "one Life"
exists; he had finally dismissed magnetism and hypnotism.

Davidson

asserts that Coleridge gradually came to believe that ideas mediate
between humanity and nature, that without ideas,

nature is but

chaos (212), certainly not capable of modeling lessons.

Gradually, he

began to think that humans must erect themselves to their true humanity, which is in Christ (213).

This qualification would enable a

person to examine nature safely and find Christ there, instead of
proceeding directly from nature (213).

Nature began to have no

truth in itself, but only those truths, Davidson argues, derived from
the mind (215); the idea of nature and the human mind as existing in
a reciprocal, interfused relationship was discounted.

Slowly, he

began to assert that humans must seek union with God and must
separate themselves from nature.

If nature has no truth rn itself,

then simply walking outdoors and being receptive to nature alone

does little good in the attempt to find divinity.
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The mind must enter

this equation, he came to believe, for this realization of evolved immanence to work, and this new immanence suitably answers the
demands of the rationalist mindset.

Immanence based on reason, a
.-

divinity in nature sensed with the assistance of the mind, does rectify reason and faith.
Coleridge's personal life reveals volumes about his gradual disIn 1795,

enchantment with both nature and his nature theories.
Coleridge was a confident man.

He was ready for the pantisocratic

scheme and had even hastily married in order to facilitate the plans.
The Bristol lectures find him denouncing public institutions (Pym
29), fulfilling his radical political bent of the time.

Unitarianism

seemed the answer to this religious queries.
Then nearly everything seemed to collapse.

He found himself

quite incompatible with the wife of whom at one time he had favorably spoken of in "The Eolian Harp."

The French Revolution became

the Napoleanic era, one tyrant replacing the monarchical tyrants.
health became a maJor concern.

His

In 1796, he started to take lau-

danum for his pain, and his addiction grew in alarming proportion.
His career seemed doomed for various reasons, most outstanding
being his failure to put many of his ideas to paper in a consistent
fashion.

More concretely, in 1796, The Watchman failed (Pym 35),

an early and thus all the more severe blow to his confidence.
Thus, by 1805, Coleridge was little short of a wreck.

He was

searching, always searching, for truth, and he felt that he had not
found it in his earlier theories.
ones?

So, logically, why not embrace new

So many of his initial beliefs had proven to be false that

it
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seemed entirely possible that some of his nature theories were not
all that they had once seemed to be.

M.H. Abrams asserts that

Coleridge was not alone in his doubts; almost all the English
Romantics lost had faith in their earlier beliefs (460).

They lost, ef-

fectively, the "assurance and buoyancy of their radical youth" (460).
To make matters worse, he felt he was losing the poetical powers that had produced verse of the quality of the conversation poems.

He confessed in a letter, "The Poet is dead in me" (Beer, Poetical

Intelligence 250).

Raimonda Modiano has an interesting theory as to

the decrease in Coleridge's ability to write poetry and his increasing
ambivalence toward nature.

She maintains that Coleridge's affections

for nature decreased in direct relation to his increasing estrangement
At the basis of this theory lies his alleged

from Wordsworth (33).

jealousy of Wordsworth for being the better nature poet (36), and,
shockingly enough, for Sara Hutchinson's desire for Wordsworth (40).
Also,

according

to

Modiano,

Coleridge

was

deeply

hurt

by

Wordsworth's assumption of sole authorship of Lyrical Ballads, after
which he often "jokingly" commented to friends how he had surrendered his role as poet to Wordsworth, and was now delving into
philosophical studies (42).

This seems conjecture entirely possible as

a crucial piece of the puzzle as to the why of Coleridge's abandonment of nature.

The theory of Sara Hutchinson being in love with

Wordsworth, and Coleridge having to suffer the myriad of pains attendant on that scenario, seems a bit far-fetched, but of course, is
within the realm of possibility.

People's actions are often profoundly

affected by romantic matters, even in instances in which the "stakes"
seem so high.

In retrospect, it is hard to imagine the ruin of a bril-
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Hant poet's abilities due m part to unrequited love, but that is human
nature.
If Coleridge abandoned a great deal of his nature theories and

the old conception of immanence, what beliefs did he consequently
embrace?

Religious ones, primarily.

He studied Spinoza, Luther, the

Caroline divines, Richard Baxter, and Kant, among many others,
picking the best of what he read and incorporating it into his own
slowly-evolving metaphysical synthesis.

As Pym acknowledges, he

had few original theological concepts of his own (19).

He found many

of Spinoza's theories to be agreeable, but decided that his pantheism
He abandoned

was a denial of the omniscience of God (36).
Unitarianism,

contemplating the virtues

(as he conceived it)

of

Trinitarianism, finally calling the trinity "the grand article of faith,
and the foundation of the whole Christian system" (23).

He found the

doctrine of the trinity to be crucial to his continued desire for immanence, a personal God, and an "inward, warm, experiental religion"
(13).

Thus, he was not a new person; he still wanted to see imma-

nence

and

believe rn

Romantics wanted.

the

personal

God

and

religion

that

the

He was, however, someone who was placing

much more faith in metaphysical speculation than in the Romantic
nature theories of previous years.
Much has been written of Coleridge's "return to orthodoxy," as
if such a prospect is positive, as if his Romantic ideas were, well,
"flaky," and now, at a mature age, he "saw the light."

Or, sometimes,

the oppositional view is taken, that he_ settled into safe thinking.

But

as critics Pym, Davidson and Radley will attest, Coleridge was always
grounded in Christianity.

Davidson says, "He always proclaimed him-

self a Christian" (1).

One should
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not allow the implicit pantheism of

the poems of the 1790s to fool himself; he was never a pantheist.

In

his metaphysical speculations, he rejected strains of thought that
seemed to lead to pantheism; hence, the partial rejection of Spinoza,
Jacob Boehme, George Fox and William Law (Radley 23).

Coleridge

had that heretical sort of a mind--voracious, devouring, sometimes
capable and unafraid of contradiction, and always-evolving--but his
flirtation with heresy is also comprehensible by the Age of Reason
and the decline of the power of Christianity-- they allowed him to
open up his thought-patterns in a way which would have been truly
inconceivable for Vaughan.
The age in which he lived m part necessarily forced Coleridge
to view religion in a new way.

He really could not believe blindly

and ignore his rational faculties and be in any meaningful way a
credit to theologians.
Spirit,

His challenge in Confessions of an Inquiring

published after his death, was precisely to try to rectify

reason and religion, a formidable task for anyone.

Undoubtedly, in

Coleridge's age many theologians still adopted the "closed-fortress"
mentality to cope with the advances of science and the waning power
of religion.

In 1925, the scientist Alfred North Whitehead was still

complaining that theology was set back by such a mentality, and
even today many prominent religious leaders have little desire to
examine the impact and influence of science; they would rather close
ranks in a seemingly defensive gesture.
challenge

Coleridge

was

undertaking

Thus, the enormity of the
cannot

be

underestimated.

Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit reflects Coleridge's sincere desire
to rectify his longing for orthodoxy and his own aggressive rational
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mindset to help destroy the theological vacuum created by the Age

of Reason.

Coleridge's rationalist faith, his rectification of seeming

opposites, is, I find, a definite response to the Age of Reason's enshrinement of rational knowledge, for as devout and orthodox as he
would like to be, reason is too highly valued to ignore, as Vaughan's
Augustinian faith does.

This faith thus helps to save the concepts of

faith and religion, both under increasing fire, and still under fire
today.
The task of rectifying reason and religion is one with a large
scope, so Coleridge refined his intellectual explorations in Confessions
to one facet; the popular belief m the Bible's total verbal inspiration,
or the "doctrine," as he calls it.
time

that

the

Bible

through human offices.

was

It was a commonly held belief of the

God's

words

verbatim,

communicated

God was a ventriloquist, and Mark, John and

the other "speakers" of the Bible but puppets who only said what God
had put into their heads--that was the Bible.
Coleridge felt this view constituted an unnecessary tenacity to
a problematic part of the Christian faith.

He had many problems

with the common acceptance of this doctrine.

It reduced all the

wonderful characters of the Bible to mere mouthpieces.

Especially

alarming was the prospect of Christ as nothing but an "automaton
poet, mourner, and supplicant" (Confessions 36; unless otherwise
noted, subsequent citations are to the Confessions.)

It literally petri-

fied the Bible, freezing it for all eternity into a "hardened, inflexible
and distant voice" (32).

The acceptanc;e of the Bible had, historically,

allowed the powerful to explain their abuses (i.e. the Inquisition,
"Popery") by Scriptural passages taken out of context.

The doctrine
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created an almost insurmountable problem in the consideration of
the several inconsistencies in the Bible.

How could God err?

attempts to explain that needed "fancy footwork" indeed.

Any

Lastly, an

unmalleable Bible made the "souls of the unwary and weak in faith"
prey to the arguments of "infidels" (79).
Instead of the almost irrational acceptance of the total verbal
inspiration of the Bible, which tested the faith of even the most devout Christian, Coleridge believed that common sense and reason
should be applied to Biblical studies.

Despite the great reverence and

respect for Biblical authority, he believed human reason was "up to
the task" of analysis:
And what though my reason be to the power and
splendor of the Scriptures but as the reflected and
secondary shine of the moon compared with the
solar radiance;-- yet the Sun endures the occasional
co-presence of the unsteady orb, and leaving it
visible seems to sanction the comparison. ( 10)
Essentially, Coleridge wanted the Bible to be treated in the
same manner as any literary work--subject to interpretation, using
our God-given critical faculties.

This approach would create a mal-

leable Bible, a document not written in stone, but subject to modern
needs.

He thus conceived of the Bible much as modern Americans

conceive of the Constitution--as an outline, a framework, but one that
can adjust to new developments and ideas.

It is the spirit of the

Bible, like the spirit of the American Constitution, that is constant.
The Bible should not be the Christian religion, but the Christian
religion should be found in the Bible; ·coleridge believed.
Christians should not be afraid of acknowledging the Bible as
divinely inspired, but spoken through humans, and thus subject to
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human error.

This view would, Coleridge hoped, suitably explain

Biblical inconsistencies as human error, not divine error.

Attempts to

invent details to "fill in the gaps" in the Biblical story only serve to
confuse matters (41), and reveal fear, not faith (95).

Accept the dis-

crepancies as human error, Coleridge said, and work with them (41).
Thus a reliance upon faith was important as the very root of
Christianity, for if someone came to Biblical study with a disbelieving
attitude, the Bible would not convince this person on its own merits
Bible study should be a mix of heart and head, faith and

(71).
reason.

Either alone is insufficient.

Faith without reason amounts to

a "Middle Ages" mentality--consisting of fear, abuse and blind acceptance; whereas reason without faith is against the very spirit of
religion, the coldness of detachment versus the warmth and good
feeling that religion is partly intended to provide.
Coleridge detested those who saw all of life from a scientific
perspective, except in their study of the Bible.

The doctrine, it

seemed, was the last bastion of blind faith in the Age of Reason, and
Coleridge wanted to bring the "light" in "Enlightenment" into the
arena of Biblical studies.

He believed that the Bible had gone "hand

in hand" with law and science for centuries, always supporting and
leading the way (72).

Unfortunately, Coleridge attempts to validate

this claim with an argument unpalatable to most thinking modern
tastes.

He felt that Christian beliefs derived from and supported by

the Bible had provided a basis for Westerners to develop the technology that had so clearly made them superior (73).
the Bible was advantageous to scientific study.

Thus, he argues,
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Coleridge had literally hungered after truth, as he said; he
loved it "with an indescribable awe" (4), and he saw reason and religion as having the capacity to be rectifiable.
about ourselves, our heritage and our world.

Therein lie the truth
As he said:

I only object to the inconsistency of those who
profess the same belief [the doctrine], and yet
affect to look down with a contemptuous smile
on John Wesley for rejecting the Copernican
system as incompatible therewith. (44)
In the tradition of Aquinas and Neoplatonism, reason and religion
could be rectified.
It is hard to say whether, all told and reading "between the

lines" of Confessions, faith or reason is preferred.

He strikes an odd

balance-- on the one hand, he favors reason in that he dares to explore intellectually his Christianity, but on the other, he draws a firm
line when his thoughts approach heresy.

But Confessions of an

Inquiring Spirit betrays a real orthodoxy at the core.

When finished

reading it, one senses a tone that favors religion and faith, perhaps
the sincerity of the tone, but whatever this intangible quality of tone
is, it is there.

Written during the last years of his life, these seven

letters to a friend reveal a man struggling to be orthodox.

Sick and

depressed, Coleridge yearned for his reason to back entirely his faith.
As I have demonstrated, Coleridge had an inquiring, rationalist
mindset, due in part to the cosmology and inheritance from the Age
of Reason.

Significantly, this mindset allowed him to salvage the

essence of Christianity and helped to create his legacy.
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COLERIDGE'S LEGACY

Coleridge's life, on several fronts, had not been particularly
successful.

Toward the end of his life, his loneliness was acute; per-

manently and severely estranged from his wife, and forbidden the
love of the woman he truly cared for, he suffered emotionally.
Physically, illnesses racked his body, forcing him to reside with Dr.
Gillman for nearly two decades before his eventual death.

On the

professional level, he was haunted by his self-perceived failure as a
nature-poet.

He was viewed by some as one who subsisted primarily

on the largess of others.

All told, it is easy to view Coleridge as a

gemus, brimming with ideas, but either unable or too distracted to
commit his musings to paper; m some respects, a wasted talent.

To

make matters worse, charges of plagiarism continue to obscure his
memory and both his integrity and perceived value to scholars.
But such thoughts belie his significant legacy as
philosopher and poet.

scholar,

In my view, his most important legacy, out-

side the sphere of his poetry, is his conception of a rationalist faith.
He was bequeathed several potential obstacles to his religious orthodoxy from the Age of Reason.

First and foremost stood the impor-

tance placed upon emperical inquiry and reason during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Secondly, growing religious skepti-

cism brought Christianity under fire from scientists.

Less and less of

the English citizenry placed full, unquestioning Augustinian faith m
Christianity.

76
Both must have pained Coleridge, so desirous as a mature man

to be devout and orthodox.

Perhaps, if he could have, he would have

preferred being more like Henry Vaughan, a full, firm believer m
Anglicanism, not daring to question his religious beliefs, having an
Augustinian faith to the last.

But he could not do so and be of any

substantive use to modern theological thought, and he knew it.

His

greatest legacy is his ability to modernize Christianity, making it effectively accountable to both the orthodox and the scientific mindset,
which valued so empiricism. Serious theologians even today would
do well to read both Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit and Aids to

Reflection; perhaps these works would assist them in their struggle
to rectify reason and faith and might even change the perception of
the "closed fortress mentality" scientists like Whitehead so despise.
That is not to say that Vaughan's Augustinian faith, as unquestioning and suspicious of reason as it was, is to be condemned.

He,

like Coleridge, was a man of his time, so such a value judgement borders on the ludicrous.

To expect him to view the relationship be-

tween God, humanity and nature as Coleridge did, as being linked
with one vital spirit, is decidedly too much to ask.
would have scoffed openly at such a prospect.

I believe he

To him, order was es-

sential: "a place for everything and everything in its place," as the
saymg goes.

For the purposes of this study, Vaughan's significance

lies in great part in his intuitive insight into a simple immanence,
linking nature and the divine, and thus unwittingly undermining the
Great Chain of Being.

Vaughan, most unknowingly, was performing

much the same function as science and rational inquiry would come
to destroy the old cosmology.

Written during a peaceful retirement
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m the countryside, Silex Scintillans was meant as both a tribute to
Herbert and as a devotional book, like The Temple .
But Silex Scintillans, Vaughan's masterpiece, would later be
considered by some as evidence of pre-Romantic beliefs.

A debate

would arise as to the source of Vaughan's work, some critics considering Vaughan a pre-Romantic, some a hermetic philosopher.

Those

who attribute pre-Romanticism to Vaughan have largely not recognized the conclusion that can be gleaned from the existence of the
debate itself.

Vaughan saw nature in a way most of his contempo-

raries most avowedly did not, as reflected divinity, and as having
great importance, if for that reason only.

Coleridge was first to see

nature as reflected divinity, or simple immanence, but would later
view the mind as absolutely critical to the discernment of nature's
divinity--an evolution from Vaughan's simple immanence.
The Age of Reason saw a new cosmology emerge--the gap
between humans and nature sustantially narrowed.

The West thus

greatly reduced its presumption in this area of thought during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Anthropocentrism, the once-

powerful idea that the world was created for humankind, was almost
completely nullified.

The death if this concept allowed the Romantics

to create a new cosmology of one spirit linking nature, humanity and
God.

Certainly, for the Romantics, humans and nature existed almost

on a parity.

But, in retrospect, a new concept of anthropocentrism

was created.

This new human-centerdness was predicated on the

fact that humans perceive and articulate the world and the relationship between God, humanity and nature.

The human mind explores

its surroundings and establishes these relationships, so our percep-

tions of God and nature necessarily stem from ourselves.
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As far as

we know, nature has not articulated its view of the world, and God
most likely has not either (although this is still disputed by more ardent Christians).

Thus, anthropocentrism of a sort is inescapable; it is

our lot, created by us and subject to our mental faculties.

We will

never escape this definition of anthropocentrism.
The fact that we rely so heavily today on our reason and that
we place such credence upon science (the new "God") shows both
how important and enduring the Age of Reason for us yet today.
This age is still critical to our modern conceptions of ourselves and
our priorities.

It is hard to imagine the extent and impact of the sci-

entific revolution m the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

When

I try to conceive of this revolution, I am forced to credit Coleridge
even more for attempting to salvage faith.

Here is not a man merely

trying to resuscitate dying beliefs, but one who recognizes the
necessity of the modernization of these beliefs.

He had both an ag-

gressive rational mindset and a desire to be orthodox, and he succesfully rectifies this seeming dichotomy, never ignoring the importance
of mystery.
legacy.

This synthesis, I firmly believe, is Coleridge's greatest
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